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To Members of the Forty-fifth Colorado General Assembly: 
As directed by H.J.R. No. 1030, 1964 session, the 
Legislative Council submits the accompanying report on 
Driver Licensing for your consideration. 
The committee appointed by the Council to conduct 
this study made its report to the·Council on November 23, 
1964. At that time, the Council adopted the report for 
transmission to the members of the Forty-fifth General 
Assembly. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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November 23, 1964 
Representative C. P. Lamb, Chairman 
Colorado Legislative Council 
341 State Capitol 
Denver, Colorado 
Dear Mr. Chairman: 
MeMBERS 
Lt. Gov. Robert L. Knou, 
Sen. Wllllem E. Bled-
Sen. Edward J. Byme 
Sen. Frank l, GIii 
Sen. Floyd Oliver 
Spuker John D. Vanderhoof 
Rep, Joaeph V. Cel1br"e 
Rep, John L. Kane 
Rep. Wllll1m 0. Lennox 
Rep. John W. Nichol, 
Rep. Cl1rence H. Qulnl1n 
Your Committee on Driver Licensing appointed 
pursuant to H.J.R. No. 1030, 1964 session, submits here-
with its report and recommendations. The committee 
believes that the irresponsible attitude of many motorists 
is the principal factor contributing to motor vehicle 
accidents. Therefore, the committee's recommendations 
are designed to motivate drivers, especially young drivers, 
to develop safe driving practices, as well as to encourage 




/s/ Representative Norman W. Ohlson 




To conduct the study on Driver Licensing, the Legislative 
Council appointed the following committee: Representative Norman W. 
Ohlson. chairman; Senator A. Woody Hewett. vice chairman; Senators 
William Chenoweth, Charles Porter, and Andrew Kelley, and Repr•senta-
tives Ruth Stockton, Don Friedman, John Moran, Walter Stalker, Mark 
Hogan, and Betty Kirk West. Representative C. P. Lamb, Council chair-
man, served in an ex officio capacity. 
The Committee on Driver Licensing held a series of six 
meetings in the course of its study. Following an organizational 
meeting, the committee conducted a public hearing on Mar 29, 1964, to 
review problems associated with financially irresponsib e motorists, 
to consider psychological factors contributing to motor vehicle acci-
dents, and to review data on motor vehicle accidents in Colorado. 
At a subsequent hearing on July 20, 1964, testimonr was presented to 
the committee on the need for an "implied consent aw" to assist in 
the prosecution of drunk drivers; State Department of Education, 
Colorado School Board Association, and driver education officials 
outlined problems relating to compulsory driver education; and offi-
cials of the moter scooter industry also met with the committee. 
Subsequent meetings were devoted to examinations of specific issues 
related to the aforementioned items and to committee findings and 
recommendations. 
In the development of statistical data and compilation of 
information relating to driving practices and driver education, the 
committee would like to express its appreciation to Mr. William Cassell, 
Chief of the Motor Vehicle Division, Dr. Donald Luketich, State Depart-
ment of Education, the data processing services of the Department of 
Revenue and Department of Highways, and to Mr. Merf Evans of the High-
way Safety Council. 
The committee also is grateful for the assistance rendered by 
the Colorado School Board Association, driver education officials, 
representatives of the _motor scooter industry, Dr. John Conger, Colo-
rado University Medical School, representatives of the insurance 
industry, and others participating at committee hearings. 
Assisting the committee in the study were Mr. Jim Wilson of 




Lyle C. Kyle 
Director 
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Committee Findings and Recommendations 
Driving a Motor Vehicle -- Right or Privilege 
In attempting to deal with the problems of licensing persons 
to drive motor vehicles this committee has encountered a misconception 
in the minds of many Coloradoans that appears to be an obstacle to 
more stringent regulation of driver licensing. That misconception 
revolves around a Colorado Supreme Court decision and the question of 
whether a driver's license is a ''privilege" or a "right." 
It is the feeling of this committee that this obstacle is more 
apparent than real and that it stems from semantics and not from 
philosophical disagreement. 
The committee in its deli~erations has encountered no one nor 
discovered any court decisions which mai~tain that a driver's license 
is a right in the sense that freedom of religion, speech, press, or 
to assemble is constitutionally guaranteed. Neither have we encoun-
tered anyone nor found any court case which maintains that a 
driver's license is a privilege that can be arbitrarily given, sus-
pended, or revoked. 
It is in this context that the committee wishes to suggest 
that the following quotation from a Kansas Supreme Court case best 
describes the philosophy which we consider pertinent to the problems 
of driver licensing: 
It is an elementary rule of law thit the right to 
operate a motor vehicle upon a public street or 
highway is not a natural or unrestrained right, but 
a ''privilege" which is subject to reasonable regula-
tion under the police power of the state in the 
interest of public safety and welfare .•.• ! 
The committee believes that such an outlook on a driver's 
license is absolutely essential if the needless slaughter and maiming 
of American citizens on the streets and roads of this state and 
nation are to be curbed. 
Some people in Colorado contend that the Supreme Court in this 
state disagrees with this philosophy based on the decision in the 
Nothaus case. The text of that decision is as follows: 
Article II, Section 3 of the constitution pro-
vides that: "All persons have certain natural, 
essential and inalienable rights, among which may be 
reckoned the right*** of acquiring, possessing and 
protecting property; ***" A motor vehicle is property 
and a person cannot be deprived of property without 
due process of law. The term property, within the 
I. Lee v. State of Kansas (1961), 358 P. 2d 765. 
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meaning of the due process clause, includes the 
right to make full use of the property which one 
has the inalienable right to acquire. 
Every citizen has an inalienable right to 
make use of the public highways of the state; every 
citizen has full freedom to travel from place to 
place in the enjoyment of life and liberty. The 
limitations which may be placed upon this inherent 
right of the citizen must be based upon a proper 
exercise of the police power of the state in the 
protection of the public health, safety and welfare. 
Any unreasonable restraint upon the freedom of the 
individual to make use of the public highways can-
not be sustained. Regulations imposed upon the 
right of the citizen to make us~ of the public high-
ways must have a fair relationship to the protection 
of the public safety in order to be valid. 
The regulation and control of traffic upon the 
public highways is a matter which has a definite 
relationship to the public safety, and no one 
questions the authority of the General Assembly to 
establish reasonable standards of fitness and 
competence to drive a motor vehicle which a citizen 
must possess before he drives a car upon the public 
highway. When a citizen meets the standards thus 
defined in a proper exercise of the police power, he 
has a right to continue in the full enjoyment of 
that right until by due process of law it has been 
established that by reason of abuse _of the right or 
other just cause it is reasonably necessary in the 
interest of the public safety to deprive him of the 
right to drive a motor vehicle on the highways. 
Such action cannot be taken without notice to the 
party affected and without an opportunity for him to 
be heard on the question of whether sufficient grounds 
exist to warrant a revocation of his right to drive a 
motor vehicle upon the highways of the state. The 
question of whether a constitutionally guaranteed 
property right can be denied for some justifiable 
reason, is essentially a judicial question, and under 
the doctrine of separation of powers of government it 
must remain a judicial question. In the instant case 
Nothaus was denied due process of law. The purported 
revocation of his license to drive was of no force or 
effect and was brought about under provisions of a 
statute which cannot be sustained. 
The · requirement of C.R.S. '53, 13-7-7, that the 
director of revenue, "*** shall suspend the license 
of each operator and all registrations of each owner 
of a motor vehicle in any manner involved in such 
accident***" unless such persons deposit a sum "suf-
ficient in the judgment of the director***" to pay 
any damage which may be awarded, or otherwise show 
ability to indemnify the other party to the accident 
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against financial loss, has nothing whatever to do 
with the protection of the public safety, health, 
morals or welfare. It is a device designated and 
intended to bring about the posting of security for 
the payment of a private obligation without the 
slightest indication that any legal obligation exists 
on the part of any person. The public gets no protec-
tion whatever from the deposit of such security. This 
is not the situation which we find in some states 
where the statutes require public liability insurance 
as a condition to be met before a driver's license 
will issue. Such statute protects the public. The 
statute before us is entirelV differe~t. In the mat-
ters to which we have particularly directed attention, 
C.R.S. '53, 13-7-7, is unconstitutional. On a matter 
so obviously basic and fundamental no additional 
citation of authority is required. , We reach this 
conclusion notwithstanding the fact that other juris-
dictions have seemingly overlooked basic constitu-
tional guarantees wh~ch must be ignored in reaching an 
opposite conclusion. 
The facts of the Nothaus case are these: 
On January 10, 1959, on a public highway in 
Teller County, a horse was struck by a motor vehicle 
driven by defendant. The director of revenue, upon 
receiving a report of the accident from one Dobbie, 
and acting under the purported authority of C.R.S. 
'53, 13-7-7, suspended the operator's license which 
had theretofore been issued to defendant. The sus-
pension followed the failure of defendant to 
"deposit security in a sum which shall be sufficient 
in the judgment of the director to satisfy any 
judgments for damages resulting from such accident 
as may be recovered***" against the defendant as 
required by the statute above cited. Defendant 
admitted receiving notice of the ''cancellation" of 
his operator's license, and also admitted that not-
withstanding the receipt of said notice he thereafter 
drove a motor vehicle at the time and place named in 
the summons and complaint filed against him. The 
sole defense relied upon by him was, and is, that 
those sections of the Safety Responsibility Law, and 
those statutory provisions purporting to authorize a 
revocation of defendant's operator's license without 
a hearing or trial, are unconstitutional.3 
The Court affirmed the decision of the trial 
court. 
2. People v. Nothaus (1961), 147 Colorado Reports 214-216. 
3. People v. Nothaus (1961), 147 Colorado Reports 211-212. 
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The committee wishes to call particular attention to two 
sentences in the Supreme Court decision. The first is" ••• The 
regulation and control of traffic upon the public highways is a 
matter which has a definite relationship to the public safety, and 
no one questions the authority of the General Assembly to establish 
reasonable standards of fitness and competence to drive a motor 
vehicle which a citizen must possess before he drives a car upon the 
public highway ••• " 
This sentence seems to the committee to clearly indicate that 
- the court will uphold "reasonable standards of fitness and competence 
to drive" and we further believe the recommendations contained herein 
meet the reasonable test. 
The second sentence in the court opinion which the committee 
wants to call particular attention to is" .•• When a citizen meets 
the standards thus defined in a proper exercise of the police power, 
he has a right to continue in the full enjoyment of that right until 
by due process of law it has been established that by reason of abuse 
of the right or other just cause it is reasonably necessary in the 
interest of the public safety to deprive him of the right to drive a 
motor vehicle on the highways ... " In the committee's opinion this is 
the particular part of the opinion which raises the semantics problem. 
Whether a driver's license is a "right" or a "privilege" in this 
instance, in the opinion of the committee, is moot because the 
principle enunciated by the court is that a driver's license can.be 
revoked on justifiable cause if due process of law is observed -- a 
point with which the committee is in full agreement. 
Licensing Standards and the Accident Problems 
In the past, the key qualifications for obtaining a vehicle 
operator's license included meeting minimum age requirements, suc-
cessful completion of a test of driving skills, a knowledge of rules 
of the road, a keen eye, and lack of any physical impairment that 
would prohibit safe driving. Although these standard motor vehicle 
operator's requirements are designed to eliminate unfit drivers from 
the nation's highways, the tests, of course, are not a complete solu-
tion for the determination and weeding-out of accident-prone drivers. 
Perhaps, the failure of the aforementioned tests may be demonstrated 
by the following analogy. 
Young drivers, under age 21, appear to comprise an age group 
most likely to possess the best physical qualifications, i.e., their 
eyesight may be sharper, and, certainly, their reaction time also 
may be quick~r than oider drivers. In addition, teenagers, all who 
recently have been tested on rules of the road, probably have the 
advantage of being informed of recent changes in traffic laws. Des-
pite these assets, the accident record of male teenagers, 18 and 19 
years of age·, as reflected by Colorado accident statistics, is twice 
as severe as that for all age groups over 25. Similarily, the accident 
record of 16 and 17-year-old aale operators ranks second highest of 
all age groups. 
Motor vehicle accidents appear to evolve out of a complex 
set of circumstances involving road conditions, traffic congestion, 
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mechanical condition of vehicles, and, most importantly, the mental 
and physical conditions of the drivers. Perhaps, the avoidance of 
accidents, to a large degree, may involve three human factors: 1) 
the driver's knowledge of risk ~otential; 2) alertness of the operator 
to the driving situationi and 3) desire on the part of drivers to act 
maturely-and rationally in every driving situation. Of course, a 
breakdown of these processes may result from the effect of alcohol or 
drugs, or simply because the individual may be emotionally disturbed, 
either temporarily or chronically, by anxiety, anger~ depression, or 
even over-exhilarated by joy or excitement. 
With this in mind, the committee is recommending legislation 
designed to encourage the development of attitudes which foster safe 
driving practices and remove drivers from Colorado highways who 
flagrantly abuse their driving privileges. 
Minimum Age for Operation of a Motor Vehicle 
One of the first suggestions made to the committee for cur-
tailing the relatively high accident rate of teenagers was to raise 
the minimum age for operation of a motor vehicle from 16 to 18. At 
first glance, the proposal appears to have considerable merit, for it 
not only eliminates an accident-prone age group, but it also removes 
a significant number of drivers from Colorado's highways. 
The proposal was rejected by the committee for the following 
reasons. 
Generally, 18-year-olds already may be faced with a period 
of transition -- secondary education, for the most part, has been 
completed; parental and school authority has been minimized; malt 
beverages are available; and the pressures of business and collegiate 
careers are developing. Because of this period of transition, and 
especially with the limitation of parental and school control, the 
committee questions whether age 18 is the desirable time for formulat-
ing and developing safe driving practices. 
Perhaps the most significant argument for not raising the 
minimum age to 18 is that it would destroy driver education in the 
public schools and, in turn, pre-empt the opportunity for formulating 
safe driving attitudes at an age when youth may be most receptive to 
driver education programs. Also, the accident involvement of teenagers 
16 and 17 is not as great as for drivers 18 through 20, especially 
when consideration is given to driving errors more or less expected of 
inexperienced drivers. Raising the minimum age to 18, of course, 
probably would result in a higher accident rate for the 18 through 20 
age group because of the addition of driving errors currently elimi-
nated at ages 16 and 17. 
Another serious disadvantage . to raising the minimum age to 
18 is that it does not take into consideration the needs of rural 
areas. The efficient operation of many family farms would be hampered 
by a restriction of the operating privileges of youngsters 16 and 17. 
Furthermore, the mobility of our society would be curtailed, to some 
degree, by limiting driving privileges to operators 18 and over. With 
these considerations in mind, the committee believes that youngsters 
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should not be turned loose at age 18 to learn to operate a motor 
vehicle at a time of reduced supervision, both at home and in the 
schools. 
Although the committee rejected the concept of ra1s1ng the 
minimum age limit, the committee recognizes that steps need to be 
taken to reduce the accident involvement of teenagers. In particular, 
the committee believes that the present point system, in reqard to 
teen-age operators, tends to work against the development of proper 
driving attitudes, i.e., a youngster with a newly acquired driving 
license tends to think that he has nothing to worry about until he has 
acquired a few violations on his driving record. In the following 
recommendations of the committee, an attempt is made to eliminate this 
negative philosophy by placing the young driver on probation at the 
time that he receives his license. The committee's recommendations 
also are based on a report by the Motor Vehicle Division that drivers 
with poor violation records, and who are on the borderline of having 
their operators' privileges suspended under the point system, appear 
to improve their driving performances because of the threat of 
suspension. 
Three Classes of Licenses 
The committee recommends a three-step approach to the issuance 
of motor vehicle operators' licenses: 1) a minor's license issued to 
16 and 17-year-olds; 2) a provisional license (ages 18 through 20); 
and 3) a regular operator's license at age 21 and over. 
Minor's License, The proposed minor's license is to include 
operators age 16 and 17. Each minor's license is to be embossed or 
printed with the numbers, not less than one-half inch in height, "16-
17." In this way, the license can readily be identified and can not 
be subject to alteration for purposes of falsifying ages. Basically, 
it is the committee's intent that a proposed minor's license be design-
ed to meet the needs of new drivers and suggests that these drivers 
receive closer scrutiny and regulation. Therefore, the committee 
proposes that a minor's license may be suspended if the licensee 
receives more than four points in violations in any 12-month period. 
This tightening of the privilege of a youngster to drive should tend 
to develop greater respect and observance of traffic laws and, in 
turn, a reduction of accident involvement. The committee also believes 
that a motor vehicle violation committed by an unlicensed minor within 
three years prior to the time an operator's license is issued should 
be subject to the point system applicable to the type of license issued. 
To assist in the administration of this program, the committee recommends 
that teenagers (16 through 20) be required to sign a statement at the 
time of licensing indicating whether they have committed a motor vehicle 
violation during the preceding three years. A false statement, of 
course, would be grounds for suspension of a license. 
Provisional License, . The proposed provisional license recom-
mended by the committee is to be issued to young people in the most 
accident-prone years -- 18 to 20. The proposed provisional license, 
in a sense, is a transitional license; the youngster still has not 
reached full emotional, mental, and physical maturity. At this age, 
a person has acquired privileges of greater freedom, including eligi-
bility to use malt beverages. On the other hand, these new freedoms may 






of older drivers. The committee believes that extensive tightening of 
the motor vehicle operator's point system for this age group is neces-
sary to pinpoint the problem driver quickly. Therefore, the committee 
recommends that drivers 18 to 20 years of age must be subject to 
license suspension if more than eight points are accumulated in any 
12-mont.h period. A reduction in the point system should, in regard to 
the proposed minor and provisional licensee, tend to penalize the 
chronic offenders to a sufficient degree that the safe driver in these 
age groups may benefit through an insurance rate reduction. 
Provisional Chauffeurs' and Chauffeurs' Licenses 
The committee believes that the point . system for chauffeurs' 
licenses should continue to correspond to those of regular operators. 
The records of the Motor Vehicle Division suggest that the vast 
majority of professional chauffeurs are not acquiring more points 
than those regularly licensed operators despite greater exposure. 
People who drive for a living probably exercise greater caution and 
restraint than the average driver simply because of their professional 
status. The committee also recommends that persons may not qualify 
for a chauffeur's position until age 18. This proposed one-year in-
crease in present minimum age limits would bring the chauffeurs' 
licenses into conformity with the recommendations of the committee 
regarding operators' licenses. However, the committee recognizes that 
denial of provisional chauffeurs' privileges to 17-year-olds may work 
as a hardship in some instances. Therefore, the committee recommends 
that the Department of Revenue extend provisional chauffeurs' privi-
leges to minor operators (17 years of age) demonstrating the necessity 
for obtaining chauffeurs' privileges. 
Strengthen Financial Responsibility of Teenagers 
Section 13-3-7(2) provides: "Any negligence or willful mis-
conduct of a minor under the age of seventeen years when driving a 
motor vehicle upon a highway shall be imputed to the person who has 
signed the application of such minor for a permit or license, which 
person shall be jointly and severally liable with such minor for any 
damages caused by such negligence or willful misconduct except as 
otherwise provided .... " The committee believes that lack of parental 
responsibility for teenagers 18 through 20 may be a contributing factor 
in the relatively high accident rate of this age group. Therefore, 
the committee recommends that parental responsibility be required for 
all drivers under age 21. In addition, the committee believes that by 
raising the age for parental liability to age 21 that a number of 
minors presently uninsured may be encouraged to obtain liability in-
surance and, to some degree, the public may be further protected, at 
least in an economic sense, from irresponsible young drivers. 
Instruction Permits 
As a part of the committee's recommendations for fostering 
the proper training and development of young drivers, the committee 
proposes that as a prerequisite for obtaining the proposed minor 




mandatory requirement for a learner's permit, coupled with a minimum 
period for possessing a permit, may encourage the utilization of 
proper training procedures, as well as developing a sense of respect 
for the operation of a motor vehicle. 
Requiring a mandatory permit also may encourage students to 
participate in driver education courses, because the learner's permit 
may be obtained at age 15 and one-half for youngsters enrolled in 
approved driver education programs, while other teen-age applicants 
must wait until age 15 and nine months before applying for a permit. 
"Implied Consent" 
"Implied consent'' simply means that any individual operating 
a motor vehicle upon the highways automatically consents to a chemical 
test to determine the alcohol content of his or her blood, whenever he 
is arrested for allegedly driving while under the influence of alcohol. 
A person may refuse to submit to a chemical test; however, the indi-
vidual may have his driver's license suspended following a hearing as 
to the reasonableness for refusing to submit to the test. In other 
words, implied consent provides the law enforcement officers with an 
additional tool in the arrest and prosecution of drinking drivers. 
Testimony to the committee indicated that, to a large extent, persons 
arrested for allegedly driving while under the influence are not sub-
mitting to chemical tests, with the result that a large number are 
escaping conviction of drunk driving charges. 
Studies of drivers involved in fatal motor vehicle accidents 
indicate that a minimum of 50 per cent of these drivers had been 
drinking. The committee believes that the high incidence of drinking 
drivers in relation to accidents, coupled with the difficulties of 
prosecuting drinking drivers, is a mandate for the adoption of an im-
plied consent law in Colorado. Furthermore, states adopting implied 
consent legislation have succeeded in suspending a number of operators' 
licenses under their respective implied consent laws, while, at the 
same time, the various state supreme courts have upheld the validity 
of implied consent legislation. 
Tighten Financial Responsibility Laws For All Drivers 
Approximately 85 per cent of Colorado motorists have purchased 
motor vehicle liability insurance; the remaining 15 per cent, coupled 
with the uninsured motorists from other states, pose a serious economic 
threat to motorists involved in accidents with financially irresponsible 
drivers. Therefore, as a matter of public policy, the committee recom-
mends that every effort should be made to encourage motorists to obtain 
insurance for the protection of the public. 
Although 100 per cent coverage for all motorists should be 
the ultimate goal, the committee does not believe that mandatory motor 
vehicle liability insurance is the answer to the problem. States 
adopting mandatory insurance appear to have two significant problems: 
1) an expensive program to enforce; and 2) a substantially higher 
insurance rate for the average motorist. In these states, the re-




of insuring the small percentage of irresponsible motorists. Also, a 
mandatory program probably can not guarantee that 100 per cent of the 
motorists actually will obtain or keep liability policies. 
The committee is of the opinion that the most economical 
method for financially responsible motorists to protect themselves 
from irresponsible motorists is through the purchase of uninsured 
motorist coverage. This insurance may be obtained for approximately 
$2.00 per year. 
The committee recommends the adoption of a proposal to amend 
Colorado's Safety Responsibility Law to require every liability policy 
to contain a provision for protection against the uninsured motorist, 
with the added provision that the policy holder may reject the protec-
tion. 
The committee also recommends the following ten-step approach 
to strengthening Colorado's Safety Responsibility Law: 
I. Colorado's Safety Responsibility Law (13-7-1 to 13-7-39, 
CRS 1953, as amended) provide~ in part, that when motorists are in-
volved in an accident in which bodily injury or property damage in 
excess of $50 occurs, the director of the Department of Revenue must 
notify the motorists involved in the accident that their licenses are 
subject to suspension if they fail to demonstrate financial responsi-
bility through proof of liability insurance, evidence of a liability 
bond, or by a deposit of security to the department in an amount 
specified by the director sufficient to satisfy judgments for damages 
or injury resulting from the accident. The act also provides that a 
motorist may request a hearing, which, in effect, usually postpones 
the director's order for suspension. The committee believes that in 
the event a hearing postpones the effective date of the suspension, 
steps must be taken to insure the public that the individual is pro-
hibited from driving a vehicle during the period of postponement, unless 
he demonstrates financial responsibility. Therefore, the committee 
recommends that present law be amended to provide that as a condition 
for postponement, the motorist must submit evidence of financial 
responsibility through an automobile liability policy, bond, or deposit 
of security. 
II. The committee recommends that the property damage require-
ment of $50, required by accident reports (see Item I, above), be 
raised to $100. At present, the department must process a great number 
of minor accident reports for the purpose of checking motorists to see 
that they comply with Colorado's Safety Responsibility Law. To a large 
extent, the processing of minor accident reports results in a compara-
tively small number of license suspensions in relation to the admini-
strative expense involved. The committee believes that raising the 
property damage limit for reporting accidents to $100 would reduce the 
administrative workload of the department. In addition, the committee 
proposes that the law be amended to allow the department to rely on 
the accuracy of information as to insurance coverage contained in the 
reports filed by motorists, at least, until the Director of Revenue 
believes the information is erroneous. In this way, the department 
may concentrate on reviewing accidents involving problem drivers and 
not be bogged down with an administrative check on the vast majority 
of properly insured motorists. 
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III. Briefly, the Safety Responsibility Law requires that 
in the event an uninsured motorist is involved in an accident he must 
post security or file a bond with the Director of Revenue sufficient 
to satisfy judgment for damages. If it is logical to require an 
individual to post security for past accidents, it may be just as 
important to require a statement of insurance for the protection of 
the public against the possibility of future accidents. On this basis, 
the committee recommends legislation to provide that if an uninsured 
motorist is required to post security for involvement in an accident, 
he also must furnish evidence of financial responsibility for future 
accidents. 
IV. At present, if a federal employee is involved in an 
accident during the course of his employment, and is at fault, the 
injured person or owner of the damaged property must seek recourse 
for damages under the auspices of the Federal Tort's Claims Act. Even 
though the judgment for damages may be satisfied under the federal 
act, the federal employee could be subject to license suspension under 
Colorado's Safety Responsibility Law, because no provision is made in 
the Colorado law for federal employees financially protected by the 
federal government. In other words, the Colorado law requires an 
individual to post security or submit a statement of insurance follow-
ing an accident, but, in this situation, the government and not the 
individual is responsible. Therefore, the committee recommends that 
legislation be enacted to clarify Colorado's Safety Responsibility Law 
to insure that an individual's license is not suspended over a techni-
cality and that recognition is given in the Colorado law for cases 
involving the Federal Tort Claims Act. 
V. If an operator's license is suspended for failure to 
report an accident or satisfy the safety responsibility requirements 
with respect to a deposit of security, the operator's license may not 
be renewed for a period of one year, unless the individual is released 
from liability or adjudicated not liable, and that no action for 
damages have been filed in connection with the accident. The committee 
believes that the law would be strengthened if, as a condition for 
renewal of a license, the individual under suspension is required to 
demonstrate financial responsibility for a subsequent three-year 
period. The committee's recommendation simply is designed to crack• 
down on financially irresponsible motorists involved in accidents by 
requiring them to demonstrate proof of financial responsibility, for a 
three-year period, as a condition for reinstatement of their licenses. 
VI. The Department of Revenue reports that the provisions of 
Colorado's Safety Responsibility Law (13-7-3, CRS 1953) pertaining to 
suspension of registration certificates and plates of motorists whose 
licenses have been suspended for a serious violation, either in Colo-
rado or out-of-state, are unenforcible. Consequently, the committee 
recommends that reference to registration certificates and registration 
plates be deleted from the law. Also, the committee proposes that, as 
a condition for the issuance of a new license to an operator whose 
license has been suspended for a serious violation or a renewal of a 
cancelled or probat~onary license, the applicant must provide'proof of 
financial responsibility for the following three-year period. In this 
event, a person whose license is suspended under the point system 
would, as a condition for reinstatement, be required to furnish the 
Department of Revenue a statement evidencing that he is insured or has 
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deposited security in lieu of insurance. In addition, a person whose 
license has been cancelled because of inability to operate a vehicle 
due to mental or physical incompetence also would be required to 
demonstrate financial responsibility. The committee also believes 
that the cost of processing license suspensions and reinstatements 
should be paid for by the problem driver. Therefore, the committee 
recommends that a $10 reinstatement fee be charged to operators having 
their licenses revoked or suspended. 
VII. Under the requirements of Colorado's Safety Responsi-
bility Law an operator involved in a motor vehicle collision, and who 
is at fault, must meet the following minimum financial responsibility 
requirements or be subject to suspension of his operating privileges: 
1) a minimum liability of $5,000 for any one person injured 
or killed; 
2) a minimum liability of $10,000 for two or more persons 
injured or killed; and 
3) a minimum liability of $1,000 in property damage. 
These standards were adopted by the General Assembly in 1935, and, in 
view of the changing value of the dollar, the committee recommends 
that the aforementioned liability limits be raised to $10,000, $20,000, 
and $5,000, respectively. Raising the dollar limits will tend to 
bring Colorado in line with the financial responsibility requirements 
in other states. 
VIII. On occasion, motorists insured with one company may 
wish to drop their coverage and insure with another company. In such 
an event, it would be possible for an individual to be covered by two 
policies within the same time-period. For instance, Section 13-7-19, 
CRS 1953, provides that an individual may establish proof of financial 
responsibility by submitting to the Department of Revenue a certificate 
of insurance, and this certificate of insurance shall not be cancelled 
by the company unless ten days written notice is given by the company 
to the Director of Revenue. During the ten-day period, it could be 
possible for an individual notified that his insurance has been cancel-
led to purchase additional insurance and be covered by two policies. 
The committee believes that a policy subsequently procured and certi-
fied to the department should operate as a cancellation of any policy 
previously certified with respect to any motor vehicle designated in 
both certificates. 
IX. In the administration of the Safety Responsibility Law, 
the committee believes that information collected concerning the 
financial responsibility of motorists utilizing the state's highways 
should be used exclusively for encouraging motorists to provide for the 
financial protection of accident victims; that is, the committee does 
not believe that accident report actions taken by the Department of 
Revenue should be referred to in any way nor be made evidence of the 
negligence of any party in an action to recover civil damages.or in 
any criminal proceeding arising out of a motor vehicle accident. 
Information gathered in the administration of the act is neither r:le-
vant nor proper for use in civil or criminal actions, and the committee 
is recommending legislation to this effect. 
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X. Motor vehicle travel across state boundaries is continuing 
at an accelerated rate, necessitating improved cooperation among 
states to minimize the impact of uninsured motorists involved in out-
of-state accidents. Lessening of the impact of uninsured motorists 
involved in interstate travel may be accomplished by the adoption of 
reciprocity provisions requiring the Director of Revenue to suspend 
the license of a Colorado resident involved in an accident in another 
state under circumstances which would require the director to suspend 
a non-resident's operating privilege had the accident occurred in 
Colorado. The committee makes this recommendation based on the statutes 
of over 30 state financial responsibility laws. 
As a final recommendation in this area, the committee believes 
that the title of Colorado's Safety Responsibility Law is a misnomer --
the law, as such, has nothing to do with safety, but, rather, is 
designed to encourage financial responsibility of all motorists -- and 
the act should be re-named Colo+ado's Financial Responsibility Law. 
Driver Education 
The committee has spent endless hours hearing testimony and 
deliberating on the necessity, desirability, value and cost of driver 
education. There appears to be considerable agreement among safety 
people and the insurance industry that driver education and training 
will improve the quality of our young people as drivers on our highways 
and thereby reduce the number of accidents~ The committee also wishes 
to endorse the driver education programs presently conducted not only 
in the public schools but in programs administered by parochial schools, 
the American Automobile Association, and other private organizations. 
In viewing driver education in Colorado, the committee is 
concerned with the relatively large number of youngsters who are not 
exposed to any formal course of driver training and, particularly, 
with the aspects of driver education most likely to foster improved 
driver attitudes. The committee believes that emphasis of the class-
room aspects of driver training should be the initial step in any 
proposals for a state-wide driver education program because of the 
problems of scheduling driver education classes within crowded cur-
riculums, financing such programs, and developing qualified teachers. 
The committee recommends continued improvement and expansion of present 
driver education programs and, in addition, that the representatives 
of the State Board of Education, Colorado Association of School Boards, 
the parochial schools, administrators and educators of the public 
schools, and private organizations active in driver training, should 
cooperate in developing standards for a proposed minimum classroom 
program of driver training as a condition to licensing drivers under 
age 18. The committee also suggests that the recommendations made in 
regard to the aforementioned proposal for a minimum program of class-
room education be presented to the Forty-fifth General Assembly for 
consideration during the 1965 session. 
xxii 
Prohibit the Operation of Motor Scooters by Teenagers 14 and 15 Years 
old 
The committee believes that the high percentage of injuries, 
in excess of 70 per cent, to operators of motor scooters involved in 
motor vehicle accidents is a mandate for removal of youngsters under 
16 from driving motor scooters on Colorado's highways. The committee 
is of the opinion that motor scooters are not a necessary means of 
transportation and that youngsters on scooters are turning the streets 
into playgrounds, constituting a menace not only to themselves but to 
the motorist who may be involved in an accident attempting to avoid a 
scooter. 
In addition, the dramatic change in the motor scooter in-
dustry brought about by the introduction of lightweight motor-driven 
cycles in the past few years has made it increasingly difficult to 
segregate the low-horsepowered, limited-speed vehicles, originally 
intended for use by 14 and 15-year-olds, under the so-called "motor 
scooter law." 
Generally, the committee concludes that the high exposure 
rate of motorized two-wheel yehicles requires a level of maturity 
equal to that required of individuals for operation of a motor vehicle. 
And, since the impetus across the nation has been for raising the 
minimum age for operation of all vehicles from 16 to 18, it is illogi-
cal to continue to allow children 14 and 15 years of age to operate 
motor scooters on Coloradofs congested municipal streets or high-speed 
rural highways. In conclusion, the committee recommends prohibiting 
youngsters 14 and 15 from operating motor scooters on Colorado's 
public roads. 
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Motor Vehicle Violations and Accidents Io Colorado 
Statistics released by the Motor Vehicle Division reveal that 
approximately 85,138 motorists over the age of 16 were involved in 
motor vehicle accidents in Colorado during 1963 (see Table I). Of this 
group, 18,7~0 motorists were between the ages of 25-34; 15,661 were 
between the ages of 35-44; 13,854 w~re between 20 and 24 years of age; 
and 10,940 were from 45 to 54 years of age. 
· · At first glance, the 25-34 age group appears to be the most 
accident-prone based strictly on the number of accidents. However, if 
the per cent of persons in each age group is compared to the per cent 
of drivers involved in accidents for each age category, another con-
.clusion can be reached. For instance, although the 25-34 age group is 
reported to have been involved in 22.035 per cent of Colorado's motor 
vehicle accidents in 1963, the 1960 census indicates that 20.019 per 
cent of the population also is in this age group. On the other hand, 
the 18 to 19 age group is - charged with 8.307 per cent of all accidents, 
and, at the same time, only represents 4.373 per cent of the population. 
In other words, the 18 to 19 age group had approximately twice the 
number of accidents per person as the 25 to 34 age group. 
Motor Vehicle Violations Reported By the State Patrol 
Table I also summarizes motor vehicle information pertaining 
to moving violations reported by the Colorado State Patrol in 1963~ 
There were more than 49,451 moving violations in 1963, according to the 
State Patrol. 
A brief glance at Table I appears to substantiate the theory 
that a correlation exists between violations and accidents. For example, 
the age group with the most violations, again, is the 25-34 year cate-
gory -- 11,337 violations, or 20.019 per cent of the total. It may be 
noted that this same group also was involved in 22.035 per cent of the 
accidents. 
If a comparison of population of age groups is made with 
motor vehicle violations of drivers in similar age groups, the 18 to 
19-year-olds appear to be the most serious offenders -- 4.373 per cent 
· of the population compared to 10.208 per cent of the violations. (Note 
that the per cent of accidents -- 8.307 per cent -- of this age group 
corresponds to the per cent of violations.) 
Column 8~ Table I, also lists an index of population to 
violations. The index of violations for 18 to 19-year-old drivers is 
2.33, while the violation index for ages 45 to 54 is .70. In comparing 
the violation index to the accident index, both show an increase from 
age 16 to ages 18 and 19 and then a decrease for the remaining years. 
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Table I 
RELAT IOf'.iSHIP OF THE NUMBER OF DRIVERS INVOLVED IN f.lDTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS AND VIOLATIONS 
TO TOTAL COLORADO POPULATION OVER AGE 16a 
( l) ( 2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Index of Index of 
Violations Accidents 
1'.o. of Per Cent To Age To Age 
Age of Population No. of Viol. Drivers of Pop. Per Cent of Per Cent of (Col. 6 (Col. 7 
Driver~ (1960 Census) State Patrolb All Acc. Over Age 16 Viol. bi: Age Ace. b::t: Age t Col.5} . Col. 5}C 
Under 16 250 584 . 506% .686% 
16 26,873 1,883 3,666 2 .320% 3.808 4.306 1.64 1.87 
17 26,458 2,167 3,510 2.285 4.382 4 .123 1.92 1.80 
18-19 50,645 5,048 7,072 4.373 10.208 8.307 2.33 1.90 
20-24 112,197 10,073 13,854 9.688 20.370 16.272 2.10 1.68 
25-34 231,853 11,337 18,760 20.019 22.926 22.035 1.15 1.10 
35-44 232,015 8,843 15,661 20.033 17.882 18.395 .89 .92 
45-54 184,941 5,531 10,940 15. 969 11.185 12 850 .7C .80 
55-64 134,997 2,766 6,642 11.656 5.593 7~801 .48 .67 
65-74 100,731 1,218 3,359 8.698 2.463 3.945 .28 .45 
75 Over 57.422 3J5 1.020 4,252 · .fJ.77 112ao .13 .26 
TOTAL 1,158,139 49,451 85,138 100.00% 100.odj 100.00% 
a. Source: Population - 1960 Census; violations - State Patrol; and accidents - Department of Revenue. 
b. The violations reported by the State Patrol are moving violations. Miscellaneous pedestrian violations, 
over weight vehicle violations, defective vehicle violations, etc., are not included. 
c. The column represents an index of per cent of population to the per cent of accidents for each age group. For 
example, the 18 to 19 age group index is 1.90 (the highest), while the index for the 35 to 44 age group is .92, 
or less than one-half the index for the 18 to 19 age group. 
Motor Vehicle Accidents and Violations of Male Drivers 
Table II reveals the relative accident and violation rates of 
male drivers in Colorado for calendar year 1963. The table is based 
on the same assumptions as Table I. 
Accidents, Approximately 64,510 male drivers were involved 
in accidents in Colorado, according to the Motor Vehicle Division 
reports. Again, male drivers from age 18 to 19 appear to have had more 
than their share of motor vehicle accidents. For instance, 18 to 19-
year-olds accounted for 6.492 per cent of all accidents, while the age 
group represents only 2.233 per cent of the population over age 16. 
For comparison of accident rates for all age groups, Column 9 lists 
an index of population to accidents, similar to Table I, i.e., age·l6 
(index 2.76); age 17 (index 2.73); ages 18 and 19 (index 2.91J; and 
ages 20 to 24 (index 2.64). After age 24, the index drops rapidly to 
.51 for male drivers over 75. Undoubtedly, the index rate for older 
drivers. may be misleading. 
Violations, Male drivers accounted for 42,801 of the moving 
violations reported by the State Patrol, or approximately 86 per cent 
of the moving violations. The worst offenders appear to be in the 18 
to 19-year-old age group, at least, as indicated by the violation index 
(4.04) reported in Column 8, Table II. The rate of violations for the 
20 to 24-year-old male drivers is the next highest with an index of 
3.78, followed by the index for 17-year-old drivers (3.27), and 16-
year-old drivers (2.81). 
Motor Vehicle Accidents and Violations -- Female Drivers 
Colorado's women drivers have achieved a better accident and 
violation record than their male counterparts (See Table III). Both 
the violation and accident indexes (Columns 8 and 9, Table III) are 
significantly lower than for male drivers for all age groups. However, 
consideration should be given to the amount of driving done by female 
drivers and the number of female drivers in relation to the number of 
male drivers. 
The accident index for female drivers may be of unusual 
interest, because the highest index is for age 16 (.93); thereafter, 
the index drops -- age 17 (.85); 18-19 (.84); 20-24 (.74); 25-34 (.50); 
etc. On the other hand, the vehicle violation index for female oper-
ators follows a pattern closer to that of male drivers, i.e., the rate 
increases from age 16 (.44) to age 18 and 19 (.56), and then drops 
rapidly -- ages 20-24 (.46), ages 25-34 (.31), ages 35-44 (.29), ages 
45-54 (.22), etc. 
Time of Accidents 
One of the questions of concern to the committee is whether 
teen-age drivers are having more than their proportionate share of 
accidents at night and whether there is a need for a restriction on 




RELATIONSHIP OF TH.i: NUMB.i:R OF MALE DRIVERS H,'VOLVED IN MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS 
AND VIOLATIONS TO TOTAL COLOR.ADO POPULATION OVER AGE 16a 
(1) (2) (3) ( 4) (5) (6) ( 7) ( 8) (9) 
Male No. Male Per Cent Per Cent Index of Index of 
Age of Population No. of Viol. 
S:tate Patrolb 
Drivers of Pop. of Total Per Cent of Violations . Accidents 
Drivers (1960 CenSU§} All Ace. Ov~r Age 16 ViQl. by Ag~ To:tal Acc. To Ag~ 
Under 16 211 525 .427% .617% 
16 13,638 1,634 2,759 1.77% 3.304 3 .243 2.81 
17 13,443 1,876 2,694 1.161 3.794 3.166 3.27 
18-19 25,860 4,456 5,524 2.233 9.011 6.492 4 .04 
20-24 55,508 8,948 10,768 4.793 18.095 12.655 3.78 
25-34 114,244 9,780 14,428 9.864 19.777 16.957 2.00 
35-44 114,890 7,413 11,319 9.920 14.991 13.303 1.51 
45-54 92,374 4,679 7,988 7.976 9.462 9.388 1.19 
55-64 65,657 2,403 4,929 5.669 4.859 5.793 .86 
65-74 47,274 1,093 2,647 4 .082 2.210 3.111 . 54 
75 Over 241941 308 229 2.154 .622 1.092 ....:.l2 
TOTAL 567,829 42,801 64,510 49. 029% 86.552% 75,816% l. 77 
a. Source: Population - 1960 Census; violations - State Patrol; and accidents - Department of Revenue. 
b. The violations reported by the State Patrol are moving violations. Miscellaneous pedestrian violations, 















RELATIONSHIP OF THE 1'.'UMBER OF FEMALE DRIVERS INVOLVED IN .VOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS 
AND VIOLATIONS TO TOTAL COLORADO POPULATION OVER AGE 16a 
( 1) ( 2) (3) (4) (5) ( 6) (7) (8) (9) 
Female No. Female Per Cent Per Cent Index of Index of 
Age of Population No. of Viol. , Drivers of Pop. of Total Per Cent of Violations Accidents 
Drivers ( 1960 Census) Stat~ Patrol0 All Ace. Over Aae 16 Viol. by Age Total Ace. To Age To Age 
Under 16 39 58 .07~ .068% 
16 13,235 249 906 1.143% .504 1.065 .44 .93 
17 13,015 291 816 1.124 .588 .959 .52 .85 
18-19 24,785 592 1,526 2 .140 1.197 1.793 .56 .84 
20-24 56,689 1,125 3,084 4.895 2.275 3.624 .46 .74 
25-34 117,609 1,557 4,324 10.155 3 .149 5.082 .31 .50 
35-44 117,125 1,430 4,334 10,113 2,891 5,094 .29 .50 
45-54 92,567 852 2,949 7.993 1. 723 3.466 .22 .43 
55-64 69,340 363 1,708 5.987 .734 2.007 .12 .34 
65-74 53,457 125 712 4.616 .253 .837 .05 .18 
75 Over 32,488 27 161 2.805 .055 .189 .02 .07 
TOTAL 590,310 6,650 20,578 50,971% 13.448% 24.184% .26 .47 
a. Source: Population - 1960 Census; violations - Colorado State Patrol; and accidents - Colorado Department of Revenue. 
o. The violations reported by the Colorado State Patrol are moving violations. Miscellaneous pedestrian violations, 
over weight vehicle violations, defective vehicle violations, etc., are not included. 
An analysis of the time of Colorado motor vehicle accidents, 
by age groups, is contained in Table IV. Five basic time periods are 
listed in Table IV along with the numbers and percentages of accidents. 
. The morning time period (5:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.) is charac~ 
terized by a smaller per cent of accidents involving 16-year-olds 
(11.321 per cent) and 17-year-olds (14.347 per cent), compared to over 
20 per cent for all ages over 25. Perhaps school attendance accounts 
for the lower rate for teen-age drivers during the morning period. 
According to Table IV, the afternoon period (12:00 noon to 
4:00 p.m.) marks a sharp increase in accidents for teen-age drivers. 
16 and 17 years old, accounting for over 30 per cent of their acci-
dents; however, the rate does not appear to be out of line with other 
age groups -- ages 18-19 (26.771 per cent), ages 20-24 (25.650 per cent), 
ages 25-34 (28.395 per cent), ages 35-44 (31.136 per cent), and ages 
45-54 (32.298 per cent). The afternoon period also accounts for a high 
per cent of accidents of older drivers -- ages 65-74 (42.067 per cent} 
and ages 75 and over (46.512 per cent). 
The evening period (5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.) appears to be a 
universally high accident period for all age groups. The percentage 
of accidents for each age group ranges from 26.667 per cent for drivers 
75 and older to 31.570 per cent for drivers 55 to 64 years of age. 
The time period of 9:00 p.m. to midnight, as listed in Table 
IV, shows a significantly higher per cent of accidents by the younger 
age groups. For example, 16-year-old dri~ers were involved in 21~062 
per cent of their total accidents during this period, 17-year-olds 
(20.190 per cent), 18 to 19-year-olds (18.574 per cent), and after that 
a steady decrease in the per cent of accidents for older age groups is 
apparent. 
Accidents after midnight account for a significant percentage 
of accidents for the 20 to 24 year age group -- 12.541 per cent. Other 
age groups having a significant rate of accidents during this time of 
the day include: 18-19 years of age -- 11.277 per cent; 25-34 years of 
age -- 8.665 per cent; 17 years of age -- 6.508 per cent; 35-44 years 
of age 6.142 per cent; and 16 years of age -- 5.002. per cent. 
Time of Violations 
The time periods for moving violations reported by the State 
Patrol for 1963 follow a pattern similar to accidents. For instance, 
the percentage of violations reported during the morning hours (5,00 
a.m. to lliOO a.m.) by the State Patrol (See Table V) is significantly 
less for teen-age drivers -- age 16 (12.028 per cent) and age 17 (14.344 
per cent), while the rate for age groups 20 to 44 is close to 20 per 
cent. 
The afternoon period, according to Table V, also presents a 
sharp increase in the teen-age violation rate. In addition.the viola-
tion rate for the evening hours is similar to the accident rates with 
a large percentage of violations reported for all age groups. The per-
centage of violations reported for the evening period ranges from 20.8M 
per cent for ages 65 to 74 to 26.098 per cent for the 35 to 44 age group. 
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Table IV 
TIME OF DAY OF NDTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS IN COLORADO IN 1963 BY AGE GROUPSa 
All Accidents 
Day Evening Night 
5:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. to Accident 
Age 11:00 a.m. 4:00 p.m. 8:00 p.m. 12:00 a.m. 4:00 a.m. Total 
16 No. of Acc. 258 729 698 480 114 2,279 
Per Cent of Acc. 11. 321% 31. 988% 30.627% 21.062% 5.002% 100.00% 
17 No. of Ace. 302 635 606 425 137 2,105 
Per Cent of Acc. 14 .347% 30.166% 28.789% 20, 190% 6.508% 100.00% 
18-19 No. of Acc. 642 1,130 1,189 784 476 4,221 
Per Cent of Acc. 15.209% 26.771% 28.169% 18.574% 11.277% 100.00% 
20-24 No. of Acc. 1,357 2,033 2,234 1,308 994 7,926 
Per Cent of Acc. 17.121% 25.650% 28 .186% 16.502% 12.541% 100.00% 
-..J 
I 25-34 No. of Ace. 2,088 2,923 2,986 1,405 892 10,294 
Per Cent of Acc. 20.284% 28.395% 29.007% 13.649% 8.665% 100.00% 
35-44 No. of Acc. 1,722 2,631 2,479 1,099 519 8,450 
Per Cent of Acc. 20.379% 31.136% 29.337% 13.006% 6.142% 100.00% 
45-54 No. of Acc. 1,275 1,893 1,842 616 235 5,861 
Per Cent of Acc. 21. 754% 32.298% 31.428% 10.51~ 4.010% 100.00% 
55-64 No. of Acc. 790 1,287 1,146 338 69 3,630 
Per Cent of Acc. 21.763% 35.455% 31.57~ 9 .311% 1.901% 100.00% 
65-74 No. of Acc. 429 806 536 127 18 1,916 
Per Cent of Acc. 22.390% 42.067% 27.975% 6.628% .940% 100.00% 
75 · 0ver No. of Acc. 140 300 172 30 3 645 
Per Cent of Acc. 21. 705% 46.512% 26.667% 4.651% .465% 100.00% 
a. Source: Accident records of the Colorado Department of Revenue. 
Table V 
TIME OF DAY OF NDTOR VEHICLE VIOLATIONS REPORTED BY THE COLORADO STATE PATROL IN 1963 BY AGE GROUPSa 
Moving Violations 
Day 
5:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. to 
11:00 a.m. 4:00 p.m. 
16 No. o.f Violations 
Per Cent of Violations 
17 No. of Violations 
Per Cent of Violations 
18-19 No. of Violations 
Per Cent of Violations 
20-24 No. of Violations 
Per Cent of Violations 
ro 25-34 No. of Violations 











35-44 No. of Violations 2,012 
Per Cent of Violations 22.771% 
45-54 No. of Violations 1,303 
Per Cent of Violations 23.567% 
55-64 No. of Violations 728 
Per Cent of Violations 26.348% 
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Per Cent of Violati_ons 27. 997% 
75 Over No. of Violations 98 
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The time period from 9;00 p,m, to midnight appears to be a 
comparatively high violation period for teen-age drivers. In fact, 
the per cent of violations reported in Table V, for each age group, 
decreases after age 20. For instance, the percentage of violations 
for 16-y~ar-olds for the period 9100 p.m. to midnight is 29.856 per 
cent; 17 years (30.004 per cent); 18 to 19 (28.211 per cent); 20-24 
years (25.052 per cent); 25-34 years (18.895 per cent); etc. 
After midnight. the violation rate drops significantlyi how-
ever, the per cent of violations by the 20 to 24-year age group is the 
highest -- 8.059 per cent. As may be noted, the per cent of accidents 
for the 20-24 age group also is the highest for this time period -- · 
12.541 per cent. 
Contributing Factors Accidents 
Although the police reports regarding contributing factors of 
motor vehicle accidents ate subjective, for the most part, and may not 
be entirely reliable, the reports reflect the bad driving habits for 
various age groups. For instance, of the 12 contributing factors 
listed in Table VI, three items appear to stand out: 
1) For drivers under 24 years, speed is listed most often as 
a contributing factor to accidents -- 16 years of age (25.134 per cent 
of all ac~idents); 17 years of age (26.923 per cent); ages 18 to 19 
(25.995 per cent); and 20 to 24 years (22.973 per cent). It also may 
be noted that after age 17, speed gradually decreases as a factor con-
tributing to accidents. 
2) The most significant contributing factor in traffic 
accidents for drivers ages 25 to 54 is drinking, accounting for 20.626 
per cent of accidents in the 25-34 age group; 20.993 per cent of 
accidents in the 35 to 44 age group; and 19.330 per cent of accidents 
in the 45 to 54 age segment. 
3) Older drivers, ages 55 and up, account for a large per-
centage of accidents involving failure to yield the right-of-way. The 
percentage of accidents for failure to yield the right-of-way for older 
age groups follows: ages· 55 to 64 ( 27. 043 per cent); ages 65-74 
. (33.752 per cent); and ages 75 and up (42.000 per cent). 
Types of Violations -- State Patrol 
Table VII lists the major types of moving violations reported 
by the Colorado State Patrol in 1963. In examining Table VII there 
appear to be four major areas of violations: 1) speeding; 2J careless 
or reckless driving; 3) disregard of traffic control devices; and 4) 
improper passing. These four types of violations account for 73.844 
per cent of violations reported. The remaining seven categories --
following too close; improper turn; failed to yield right-of-way; 
attempt to elude police; driving left of center; drinking; and driving 
while license suspended -- were responsible for 26.156 per cent of 
violations reported for 1963. 
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Table VI 
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IN M'JTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS INVOLVING INJURY AND DEATH IN COI.aWXl DURING 1963a 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) ( 10) ( 11) ( 12) (13) 
Pass .· Disregard 
Failed Left If!lp. Stop Traffic Followed Imp. · Bru,s In .. 
~ ~ Yield R/W ~ Over Taking Sign Control Too Close Turn Qlhil Inadequate J:ighy Drinking Totals 
16 Number of Acc. 187 139 53 l 22 24' 60 11 200 23 2 22 744 
% of Acc. Each A9e 25.134% 18.683% 7.124% .134% 2.957% 3.226% 8.065% 1.478% 26.882% 3.091% .269% 2.957% 100.00% 
1 7 Number ·of Acc. 189 122 45 -o- 11 12 57 13 200 15 3 35 702 
% of Acc. Each Age 26.923 17.37,9% 6.410% -o- 1.567% 1.709% 8.120% 1.852% 28.490% 2.137% .427% 4.986% 100.00% 
18-19 Number of Acc. 405 179 109 3 40 51 129 23 380 40 6, 193 1,558 
% of Acc. Each Age 25.995% 11.489% 6.996% .193% 2.567% 3.273% 8.280% 1.476% 24.390% 2.567% .385 12.388 100.00% 
20-24 Number of Acc. 745 339 219 2 66 118 242 . 51 802 67 14 578 3,243 
% of Acc. Each Age 22.973% 10.453% 6.753% .062% 2.035% 3.639% 7.462% 1.573% 24.730% 2.066% .432 17 .823% 100.00% 
I 25-34 Number of Acc. 559 491 215 6 7~ 100 309 52- 845 68 21 712 3,452 ... % of Acc. Each Age 16.194% 14.224% 6.228 .174% 2.144% 2.897% 8.951% 1.506% 24 .479% 1.970% .6()8% 20.626% 100.00% 
0 
I 35-44 Number of Acc. 436 413 161 4 55 86 275 55 661 52 15 588 2,801 
% of Acc. Each Age 15.566% 14.745% 5.748% .143% 1.964% 3.070% 9.818% 1.964% 23.599% 1.856% -536% 20.993% 100.00% 
45-54 Number of Acc. 230 351 112 2 57 76 147 37 422 32 3 3!>2 1,821 
% of Ace. Each Age 12.630% 19.275% 6.150% .110% 3.130% 4.174% 8.072% 2.032% 23.174% l. 757% .165% 19.330% 100.00% 
55-64 Number of Acc. 109 278 52 . -0- 44 60 103 23 206 20 8 125 1,028 
% of Ace. Each Age 10.603% 27 .043% 5.058% -o- 4.280% 5.837% 10.019% 2.237% 20.039% 1.946% .778% 12.16(1Jr; 100.00% 
65-74 Number of Acc. 48 188 26 l 25 36 42 22 132 9 -o- 28 557 
% of Acc. Each Age 8.618% 33.752% 4.668% .180% 4.488% 6.463% 7 .540% 3.95(1Jr; 23,698% 1.616% -o- 5.027% 100.00% 
75. Ov~r Number of Ace. 18 84 6 2 13 16 10 8 34 2' -o- 7 200 
· % of Acc. Each Age ~ ~ ~ l..QQQ% ~ ~ 2.,_QQQ% ~ 11:~~Q% ~ -o- ~ lQQ,00% TOTAL 2,926 2,584 998 21 407 579 1,374 295 328 °72 2,640 16,106 
18.167% 16.044% 6.196% .130% 2.527% 3.595% 8.531% 1.832% 24.10~ . 2.037% .447% 16.391% 100.00% 
a. Source: accident reports of the Colorado Depart11,~t ~( Revenue. 
Table VII 
TYPE OF VIOIATIONS REPaneo BY THE COLORADO STATE PATROL IN 1963a 
Attempt Disregard Careless or 
Driving 
While 
Follow Improper Failed To To Elude Traffic Left Of Improper Reckless Ucense 
~ Speeding Too Close Turn Yield R/W Police Control Center Passing Driving Drinking suspended ~ 
16 Number of Viol. 467 51 65 105 2 278 128 133 619 6 29 1~883 . 
% Viol. Each Age 24 .801% 2.708% 3.452% 5.576% .106% 14.764% 6.798% 7.063% 32.873% .319% 1.540% 100.00% 
17 Number of Viol. 646 95 78 86 . -o- 336 125 134 581 16 70 2,167 
% Viol. Each Age 29.811% 4.384% 3.600% 3.969% -o- 15 . 505% 5.768" 6.184% 26.811% .738% 3.230% 100.00% 
18-19 Number of Viol. 1,703 172 137 179 4 714 322 443 l, 147 61 166 5,048 
% Viol. Each Age 33.736% 3.407% 2. 714% 3.546% .079% 14.144% 6.379% 8.776% 22. 722% 1.208% 3 . 289% 100.00% 
20-24 Number of Viol. 3,530 365 263 258 6 1,480 705 1,059 1,876 239 292 10,073 
% Viol. Each Age 35.044% 3.624% 2.611% 2.561% .059% 14.693% 6.999% 10.513% 18.624% 2.373% 2.899% 100.00% 
25-34 Number of Viol. 3,584 420 368 349 3 1,994 799 1,274 1,811 461 274 11,337 
% Viol. Each Age 31.613% 3. 705% 3.246% 3.078% .027% 17.588% 7 .048" 11.238% 15.974% 4.066% 2.417" 100.00% 
35-44 Number of Viol. 2,386 364 359 314 2 1,461 662 1,002 l.;361 627 305 8,843 
% Viol. Each Age 26 . 982% 4.116% 4.060% 3.551% .023% 16.521% 7.486% 11.331% 15.391% 7.090% 3.449% . 100.00% 
' I 
,-. 45-54 Number of Viol. 1,223 213 257 258 -0- 942 516 698 787 475 162 5,531 .... % Viol . Each Age 22.112% 3.851% 4.646% 4.665% -o- 17.031% 9.329% . 12.620% 14 .229% 8.588% 2.929% 100.00% 
55-64 Number of Viol. 444 100 196 218 1 489 257 444 365 197 55 2,766 
% Viol . Each Age 16.052% 3.615% 7.086% 7.882% .036% 17 .679% 9.291% 16.052% 13.196% 7.122% 1.989% 100.00% 
65-74 Number of Viol. 117 39 98 136 -o- 259 142 196 171 48 12 1,218 
% Viol. Each Age 9.606% 3.202% 8.046% 11.166% -o- 21.264% 11.659% 16.092% 14.039% 3.941% .985% 100.00% 
75 Over Number of Viol. 16 12 43 52 -o- 54 39 49 59 5 6 335 
% Viol. Each Age ~ ~ ~ ~ -o- ~ ~ ~ .lL.ill% ~ ~ lQQ..QQ.% 
TOTAL 14., 116 1,831 1,864 1,955 18 8,007 3,695 5,432 8,777 2,135 1,371 49,201 
28.691% 3.722% 3.789% 3.973% .036% 16.274% 7.510% 11 .040% 17.839% 4 .339% 2.787" 100.00% 
~. Source: records of Colorado State Patrol. 
Of the 49,201 violations listed in Table VII, 16-year-olds 
accounted for 1,883 violations: 619 violations -- reckless driving 
(32.873 per cent); 467 violations~- speeding (24.801 per cent); and 
278 violations involved disregard of traffic control devices (14.764 
per cent). Seventeen-year-old drivers experienced a similar relation-
ship of violations: careless or reckless driving -- 26.811 per cent; 
speeding -- 29.811 per cent; and disregard of traffic control devices --
15.505 per cent. It may be interesting to note that careless or reckless 
driving violations show a steady decline as a percentage of violations 
for each age group, through age 64. Only 13.196 per cent of violations 
involved careless or reckless driving for the 55 to 64 age group. 
The outstanding violation reported by the State Patrol for 
drivers 18 to 34 appears to be speeding, accounting for over 30 per 
cent of the violations of drivers in this age category. 
In general, older drivers do not have an outstanding type of 
violation, at least in relation to the violations reported for younger 
drivers. For instance, violations reported for drivers ranging in age 
from 55 to 74 appear to fall into five categories, with over 14 per 
cent of violations reported for improper passing; over 13 per cent for 
reckless driving; over 16 per cent for disregard of traffic control 
devices; and over nine per cent for speeding and driving left of center. 
Summary of Colorado Accident and Violation Data 
Colorado accident and violation data compiled for calendar 
year 1963 indicates that male drivers, 18 to 19 years old, are involved 
in more accidents and violations per person than other drivers; male 
drivers 16 and 17 years old account for the second highest accident-
prone group in relation to the total population; and the third highest 
accident-prone group is the 20-24 year age group. After age 24, the 
relative frequency of violations and accidents for male drivers drops 
significantly. 
Female drivers, of comparable age, have achieved a much lower 
accident and violation rate than their male counterparts • . The accident 
rate for female drivers also declined substantially from age 16, at 
least in relation to the population of various age groups. 
Frequency (per cent) of motor vehicle accidents for various 
age groups apparently is similar from 5100 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. in the 
evening, while the later hours, 9:00 p.m. to midnight, had a high 
percentage of accidents of younger drivers in 1963. Also, drivers age 
20 to 24 were involved in over 10 per cent of their accidents after 
midnight. Accidents after midnight for other age groups amounted to 
less than eight per cent of their respective accidents. 
Three factors appear to dominate 1963 Colorado motor vehicle 
accident data in relation to circumstances contributing to accidents --
1) speed; 2) drinking; and 3) failure to yield the right-of-way. 
Excess speed apparently is the dominant factor contributing to vehicle 
accidents involving drivers under 24 years; drinking is the most 
significant factor leading to accidents of drivers age 25 to 54; and 
failure to yield the right-of-way is a common factor in accidents 
involving drivers over 55. 
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Practices In Licensing Young Drivers 
Minimum Ages 
Table VIII contains a brief description of minimum age require• 
ments for motor vehicle driver licenses in all 50 states. Generally, 
age 16 is the minimum age teenagers are permitted to obtain regular 
motor vehicle licenses to operate vehicles on public highways\ however, 
there are a few exceptions. For instance, North Dakota may issue a 
driver license to a 13-year-old, if need is shown by the parents. In. 
Texas, a 14-year-old may obtain an unrestricted license if conditions 
exist which make it necessary, .or if the 14-year-old satisfactorily 
has completed a state-approved course of driver education. Other 
states issuing restricted licenses or beginner permits to 14-year-olds 
include, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Oregon, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, and Wisconsin. A minimum age of 15 is permissible in 
six states: Hawaii, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Virginia, and 
Wyoming. Of these states; parental consent is required for minors in 
Hawaii (under 20 years of age), Montana (under 18, license also pro-
visional until age 21), Virginia (under 18), and Wyoming (under 21). 
Another five states do not i~sue regular or nonrestricted licenses 
until age 17 or 18: Maine, age 17 lat age 15 a restricted license may 
be issued for travel to and from school); New Jersey, age 17 (a 
restricted license may be issued at age 16 for agricultural purposes); 
New York, age 18 (must be 21 years of age to drive in New York City); 
Pennsylvania, age 18 (junior license, age 16; prohibits driving 
between midnight and 5:00 a.m .• ); and Massachusetts (junior license may 
be obtained at age 16; prohibits driving between lsOO a.m. and 5100 
a.m.). 
Types of Restrictions 
Although the vast majority of states issue vehicle licenses 
to teenagers, 18 years old and under, a number of these states provide 
additional conditions for the teen-age driver not required of adult 
drivers. For instance, eighteen states (Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, 
Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Mass-
achusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, and Wyoming) require parental consent, in some form, prior 
· to the issuance of a motor vehicle license. Another twenty-five states 
require provisional licenses -- COLORADO (until age 17), Connecticut, 
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, 
Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin -- or place some other type of 
restriction on the motor vehicle licenses issued to persons under 21. 
Still other states require teenagers to complete driver education 
courses -- Connecticut (ages 16-18), Idaho (14-16), Michigan (under 18), 




SURVEY OF STATE MINIMJM AGE REQUIREMENTS TO OPERATE A -.OTOR VEHICLE* 
Min. Age Restrict~ ~iceose be1ro1r's f1rmi1 
To Operate Parents Junior or Complete Cert. Min. 
~ Motor Vehicle consent Provisional Training Course ~ Required 
Alabama 16 15 X 
Alaska 16 Under 18 
Arizona 16 Under 18 X 
Arlcansasl 16 Under 18 X 
California 16 15~ 
COLORA002 16 Under 17-- 16 16 X 
Connecticut3 16 Under Age 21 16-18 
Delaware 16 --- X 
Florida 16 14-18 14 X 
Georgia 16 15 15 X 
Hawaii 15 Under 20 X 
.... Idaho 16 14 14-16 X 
~ IllinoiJ 16 Under 18 X 
Indi~na 16-one mo. 16 X 
Iowa 16 14 14 
Kansas 6 16 14 X 
Kentucky 16 Under 18 X 
Louisiana 15 --- X 
Maine7 17 Under 18 . 15 X 
Maryland 16 Under 21 (Under 21 proof of financial responsibility) X 
MassachusettsB 18 Under 18 16-18 X 
Michigan9 · 16 Under 18 15 Under 18 ---
MinnesotalO 16 --- 16-21 X 
Mississi~fi 15 X 
Missouri 16 
Montana 15 Under 18 License provisional until age 21 X 
Nebraska 16 14 X 
Nevada 16 X - --- l5~ X 
New Hampshirel2 16 15 
New Jersey 17 Age 16 - Agricultural purposes X 
Table VIII 
(continued} 
Min. Age B11!ri,!~ Li~~nse l:urn1r 'i P1mii 
To Operate Parents Junior or Complete Cert. Min. 
llili MQtQr V1bi~h gQ!lil!li PrQYiiiQoal Tui,nlng C2u.:i! &1L R1g!Jir1d 
New Mexico13 16 16 15 15 2/3 X 
New York 18 16 17 X 
North Carolina14 16 Under 18 16-18 
Nort~ Dakotal5 16 13 X 
Ohio 6 16 16-21 
Oklahoma17 16 15~ X 
Oregon 16 14 15 X 
Pennsylvanial8 18 16-18 16 17 X 
Rhode lslandl9 16 X 
South Carolina2O 16 14 14 




16 14 14 X 
Utah 16 15~ X 
Vermont 16 16 X 
Virginia23 15 15 15 X 
Washington 16 X 
West Virg~nia 16 X 
Wisconsin 4 16 14-16 
Wyoming 15 Under 21 
* Source: Digest of Motor Laws, 1964, published by American Automobile Association. 
1. Arkansas -- ~e 14 to 16 license issued but must be accompanied by licensed adult. 
2. Colorado -- Learner's permit may be issued to students in high school driver education class at age 15~. 
3. Connecticut -- May provide evidence taught by parent or guardian 5 years preceding date of certificate in lieu 
of driver training course. 
4. Indiana -- Minimum age 16 years, one month, if driver education course completed; other, 16 years 6 months. 
5. Iowa -- School license and instruction permit issued at age 14. 
6. Kansas -- Restricted license operator may drive motor vehicle between 7:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. 




















Massachusetts -- Junior permit prohibits driving between 1:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. 
Michigan -- Restricted license for one year at age 14 or 15. May operate between 7:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. if 
necessary for farm operations. 
Minnesota -- Agricultural worker may obtain license at age 15. 
Missouri -- May operate vehicle under school supervision at age 15. 
New Hampshire -- May operate vehicle under school supervision at age 15. 
New Mexico -- Provisional license issued age 16; issued at age 15 if driver education course graduate. 
North Carolina -- Minimum age for chauffeurs· hauling property -- 18; for chauffeurs hauling passengers -- 21. 
Also, new drivers cannot operate on highway without permit. 
North Dakota -- Restricted license issued at age 13 when need shown by parent. 
Ohio -- Restricted license issued at age 14 in hardship cases. 
Oklahoma -- Driver education students may obtain learner's permit at age 15~. 
Pennsylvania -- Junior drivers prohibited driving midnight through 5:00 a.m., unless accompanied by parent. 
Rhode Island -- Applicants under 18 years must complete 30-hour driver education classroom courses provided by 
registry. 
South Carolina -- Restricted license may drive between hours of 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. 
Texas -- May issue license at age 14 if absolutely necessary or if completed state-approved course of driver 
education. 
Utah -- Minimum age 15~ if approved driver education course completed. 
Virginia -- License may be issued at age 15 with parental consent. Some cities and counties prohibit operation 
under age 16. 
Wisconsin -- May issue junior permit at age 14 if need is proven. 
Psychological Factors Involved In Traffic Accidents 
On May 29, 1964, Dr. John Conger, Dean, Colorado School of 
Medicine, met with the committee to discuss the relationship of psycho-
logical factors to traffic accidents. An excerpt from the committee 
minutes of May 29th summarizing Dr. Conger's presentation appears below. 
"Dr. John ~onger, Dean, Colorado School of Medicine, stated 
that accidents are the complex results of many variables; however, in 
most instances, the individual is the most significant problem. For 
instance, he continued, a study of a selected group of military person-
nel between 18 and 23 years of .age revealed the followings 
1) The young men were subjected to a number of psychological, 
physiological, and psycho-physical tests involving depth perception, 
reaction time, heart, respiration, intelligence, reaction under stress 
situations, personality factors, etc. Following a comparison of driv-
ing records and test results, the study team concluded that physical 
factors are far less important than attitudes in causing automotive 
accidents. 
2) Two composite personality sketches could be determined for 
accident-prone drivers and safe drivers. For instance, · individuals 
achieving excellent driving records tended to have conventional values; 
a clear notion of goal~; respect for others; accepted by their associ-
ates; and underlying anger and hostility problems usually are compen-
sated by overly strong needs for conformity and overly strong needs to 
placate their associates. On the other hand, high accident rate types 
may tend to be unconventional; self oriented; unaware or insensitive 
to rights of others; and encounter difficulty in controlling anger, 
resulting in verbal aggression; preoccupation with own fantasy world; 
etc. 
"Although further research on psychological factors involved 
in traffic accidents is needed, a few statements may be made, Dr. Conger 
said: 
l) The individual must never permit the routine of driving to 
make one insensitive to his responsibilities, which means the individual 
must not drive when drugged, overtired, or following the consumption of 
· alcohol. 
2) An individual should not drive when worried about personal 
problems, especially if he has a tendency to daydream. 
3) If the individual is preoccupied, he is more likely to 
have an accident. 
"At this time. or. Conger cautioned the committee on the 
effectiveness of psychological tests, indicating that they may be use-
ful in selecting safe drivers. but if the tests are to be used for 
purposes of restricting the issuance of licenses, attention must be 
given to the fact that no psychological test is 100 per cent accurate. 
Psychological tests do not offer a simple solution for elimination of 
highly accident-prone drivers, he concluded; however, the tests may be 
an effective tool in evaluating persons achieving a significant number 
of violations." 
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In general, accident avoidance may involve a knowledge of 
risk potential, constant alertness to the external environment, a 
capacity to act intelligently and the desire to do so. A breakdown of 
these processes may result when an individual is emotionally disturbed, 
either temporarily or chronically, by anxiety, anger or depression, or 
over-exhilarated by joy or excitement. Perhaps expanded safety educ-
ation for children and adults may tend 10 foster attitudes that may 
minimize potential accident situations. · 
l. Encyclopedia of Mental Health, A Deutsch Ed. New Yorks Watts, 1963 
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"Implied Consent" 
What is "implied consent," at least, as it pertains to motor 
vehicle laws? Generally, "implied consent" simply means that any in-
dividual who is licensed to operate a motor vehicle upon the highways 
of a state, and is arrested for driving while under the influence of 
alcohol, automatically consents to a chemical test to determine the 
alcohol content of his or her blood. Of course, a person may refuse 
to participate in a chemical test; however, refusal to submit to a 
chemical test may result in suspension of the individual's driver 
license. 
Need For Implied Consent Legislation 
Accident Records of Persons Under the Influence of Alcohol, 
"In general, the recent evidence suggests that alcohol is causally 
related to about 50 per cent of fatal accidents in the United States. 
This revised estimate is based on the frequency with which high (0.15 
per cent and greater) levels of blood alcohol have been found at 
autopsy: 
a. When large proportions of the drivers and pedes-
trians killed in accidents in various jurisdictions 
have been tested. 
b. When alcohol determinations have been made on all, 
or nearly all, the drivers killed in particular 
geographic areas in specific types of accidents 
which can largely be presumed driver-caused (e.g., 
single vehicle, non-pedestrian accidents). 
c. In a successive series of fatal accidents, com-
paring blood alcohol levels of drivers killed in 
accidents for which they were responsible, with 
those of drivers killed but not responsible, and 
of unknown responsibility. 11 2 
A Toronto study ·conducted by H. W. Smith and R. E. Popham, 
reveals a significant relationship between the motor vehicle accident 
hazard and the per cent of alcohol in a person's blood.3 For instance, 
if the blood alcohol content is between 0.10 and 0.15 per cent, the 
probability of causing an automobile accident appears to be 2~ times 
greater than for individuals with 0.00 to 0.05 per cent blood alcohol 
content. Furthermore, the probable accident rate for persons with a 
blood alcohol percentage of over 0.15 ,may be 9.7 times the rate for 
individuals with less than 0.05 per cent alcohol in their blood. 
2. 
3. 
McFarland, Ross, "Alcohol and Highway Accidents," Traffic Digest 
and Review, Traffic Institute, Northwestern University. 
"Blood-alcohol Levels in Relation to Driving," Canadian Medical 
Association Journal, Vol. 65, 1951, pages 325-328. 
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A recent Indiana study reveals a similar correlation between 
blood alcohol levels and accident hazard. Of particular interest con-
cerning the findings of the Indiana study is the drop in the accident 
rate for drivers with a blood alcohol content of between 0.01 and 0.03 
per cent. 
"The relative probability of causing an accident necessarily 
starts at 'one' for the no alcohol class. As the alcohol level in-
creases, the curve falls until a low of about 0.6 is reached at the 
0.03 per cent alcohol level. Based on the data collected and the 
method of analysis used, subjects with blood alcohol levels of 0.03 
per cent are about one-third less likely to cause accidents than 
alcohol free-drivers. As the blood alcohol level continues to increase 
beyond 0.03 per cent, the relative probability of causing accidents 
starts to increase. 
"Subjects with blood alcohol levels close to 0.04 per cent are 
about as likely to cause accidents as completely sober drivers. When 
an alcohol level of 0.06 per cent is reached, the estimated probability 
of causing an accident is double that of a driver from the no alcohol 
level group. Drivers with 0.10 per cent blood alcohol level are more 
than six times as likely to cause an accident as one with no alcohol. 
When the 0.15 per cent alcohol level is reached, the pro~ability of 
causing an accident is increased to more than 25 times." 
Difficulties of Identification, "Identification of the drink-
ing driver is difficult. When an officer contacts a driver whom he 
suspects of being under the influence, he must assure himself that the 
suspect is actually under the influence to a degree that makes him a 
hazard on the highway. If the officer is so assured, he then must 
obtain evidence to be presented in court which will convince the judge 
and jury, as the officer himself was convinced, that the driver was in 
fact under the influence of intoxicating liquor~ 
"A number of factors make this identification difficult. First, 
the appearance and actions of the suspect must be different from those 
of a normal, sober person. When appearance and actions are clearly 
abnormal, it must be ascertained that the abnormality is caused by -
alcohol. There are some 64 pathological conditions producing symptoms 
which are the same or similar to those of alcoholic intoxication. The 
officer must be certain that the suspect's condition is due to an alco-
holic intoxicant and not due to an illness, injury or drug. Second is 
the legal definition of the condition or the degree of intoxication at 
which a person is considered to be 'under the influence.' In general, 
appellate courts have held that any degree of impairment of physical or 
mental capabilities should be considered as 'under the influence.' 
Since it is obviously impossible for the apprehending officer to know 
each person's capabilities and actual fitness when sober, prior to 
apprehension, the officer must compare the suspect's condition with 
what he individually considers as normal. This results in a lack of 
uniformity in the apprehension of drinking driver suspects. One officer 
with a particular background of training and experience might fail to 
arrest a suspect whom another officer with a different background would 
4. B6rkenstein and Crowther, "The Role of the Drinking Driver In 
Traffic Accidents," Traffic Digest and Review, Traffic Institute, 
Northwestern University, page 7. 
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. arrest, both officers being tompletely honest in their opinions of 
the condition of the suspect. There is no rule of thumb test by which 
any police officer, or any doctor for that matter, can look at a sus-
pect and say positively in every case ;hat he was or was not under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor." 
Difficulties of Prosecution. "The difficulties of prosecut-
ing the drinking driver are many. There is no assurance that the 
verdict will be 'guilty as charged' even though the officer presents 
evidence that (1) there was the odor of an intoxicating beverage on 
the breath and about the person of the defendant; (2) his speech was 
slurred and incoherent; (3) his face was flushed; (4) he staggered arid 
weaved when walking; (5) he admitted having had 'two beers'; l6) and 
perhaps most important, his driving was erratic and he committed one 
or more violations of traffic regulations (7) he was belligerent, and 
(8) evidence of the many other factors which led them to believe that 
he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. While police of-
ficers usually lean over backwards to be sure that the suspect is 
sufficiently impaired, they can be wrong. As mentioned above, sickness, 
injury, or medication can produce symptoms similar to those of alco-
holic intoxication. These defenses are frequently claimed improperly 
and the result is the same as though the person were so affected."6 
Chemical Tests 
Methodology. "The various parts of the body t~ke up the alco-
hol in proportion to their water content. The brain, liver, and blood 
have the same fraction of water content and, therefore, hold about the 
same per cent of alcohol. Urine, saliva, and spinal fluid, having a 
higher water content, hold a higher per cent of alcohol. The decrease 
of alcohol in the body which takes place because of oxidation and 
excretion occurs at practically the same rate thoughout the body. 
"The intoxicating effect is produced by the alcohol stored in 
the brain; the degree of intoxication is thus proportional to the per 
cent of alcohol stored there. Since the relation of alcohol in other 
parts of the body to that in the brain remains constant, the per cent 
of alcohol in the brain can be determined by measuring alcohol in other 
parts of the body. Thus ·a determination as to the per cent of alcohol 
in the . brain is made possible by testing other body materials. The 
body substances most commonly used are blood, urine and breath, although 
saliva may be used."7 
Blood Test. Briefly, the blood test may provide the most ac-
curate measure of the relative alcohol content of the brain. However, 
a serious drawback to administering a blood test to persons charged with 
driving while under the influence of alcohol is that the test requires 
the services of a physician or a trained technician to obtain a sample 
of the blood. Consequently, motor vehicle officials have turned to 
other means for determining the alcohol content of a defendant's body. 
5. Public Memo 29. National Safety Council, October 1957. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Interim Report of the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on 
Motor Vehicle Problems, "Chemical Tests for Intoxication," page 27. 
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Saliva Test. As previously mentioned, alcohol may be found in 
proportion to the water content in a person's body. Since the water 
content of saliva is higher than for blood, the alcohol content also 
is greater. 
Urine -Tests, Urine tests may not be as accurate as other 
chemical tests for alcohol content for two reasons: 1) the higher 
water content in a sample of urine compared with other parts of the 
body; and 2) alcohol may be stored in the bladder of a person for an 
indefinite period, and, of course, before the alcohol reaches the 
bladder it must be filtered from the bloodstream through the kidneys. 
Breath Tests. The Committee on Tests for Intoxication, National 
Safety Council, reports that the reliability of breath tests --
Drunkometer, Intoximeter, and Alcometer -- in relation to blood tests 
has proved satisfactory. Results of the committee's study indicate 
that a maximum deviation of 0.015 per cent in the blood alcohol content 
may exist between blood and breath tests. Since the individual's re-
sponse_ to alcohol may be far in excess of the error in chemical analysis, 
the 0.015 per cent deviation may not be significant.8 
The provisions of the Colorado statutes on chemical tests 
(13-4-30(2), 1960 Perm. Supp. to C.R.S. 1953) are similar to the 
Uniform Vehicle Code; however, in May of 1962, the Uniform Vehicle 
Code lowered the maximum level of 0.15 per cent alcohol content to 
0.10 per cent. The lower standard is based, at least in part, on 
recommendations of the American Medical Association. 
Generally, chemical test legislation has been adopted in 38 
states, including Colorado. Of these states, all but three -- North 
Carolina, North Dakota, and New York -- have the same maximum level for 
alcohol content as Colorado, i.e., a blood alcohol content of 0.15 per 
cent. The other three states have adopted the ~ame standard as the 
Uniform Vehicle Code, or a level of 0.10 per cent alcohol content • 
. Implied Consent Legislation 
Implied consent legislation has been adopt~d in twelve states--
Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, Ut~h, Vermont, and Vir9inia. New York was the 
first state to adopt an implied consent law (1953), and the states 
recently adopting implied consent legislation include Connecticut and 
Iowa, both in 1963. Also, implied consent legislation has been intro- . 
duced in another 24 state legislatures, including Colorado. 
. Connecticut Law. Perhaps the Connecticut law may illustrate 
what other states are incorporating in implied consent legislation. 
For instance, the Connecticut law provides: 
" •••• refuses to submit to either a breath or blood test, at the 
option of such person, the test shall not be given, but if the court 
or jury, upon request finds that such person was operating such motor 
vehicle, the motor vehicle commissioner shall suspend or revoke his -
8. Evaluating Chemical Tests for Intoxication. National Safety Council, 
page 10. 
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license or nonresident operating privilege, the terms and conditions 
of which shall be determined by the commissioner of motor vehicles. 
The provision of this section shall not apply to any ·person whose 
physical condition is such that, according to competent medical advice, 
such test would be inadvisable ••• "9 · 
The Connecticut law also requires that in the event a chemical 
test is administered, a copy of the test result must be mailed to the 
defendant; the test must be given according to instructions and materi-
als approved by the department of health; the testing device must be 
checked for accuracy; the defendant must be given an opportunity for a 
an additional test; and additional evidence must be presented at the 
hearing on the question of whether the defendant was driving while 
under the influence of alcohol. 
Iowa Law, The Iowa law (1963) is quite similar to the Uniform 
Vehicle Code in that if a defendant refuses to submit to a chemical 
test, the commissioner of motor vehicles may suspend the license prior 
to a hearing. Also, the Iowa law requires that a licensed physician, 
or a registered nurse or medical technologist designated by the physi-
cian, acting at the written request of the police officer, only may 
withdraw the bodily substance. 
Constitutional Issues -- Court Decisions 
Following adoption of the first implied consent law in New 
York in 1953, the New York Supreme Court in Shutt v, MacDuff (1954), 
127 N.Y.S. (2d) 116, ruled the implied consent law invalid because of 
its failure to provide adequate safeguards for due process of law. In 
ruling the law invalid, the court stated, in parts 
••• A studied and critical examination of the 
particular statute as written, has caused this court 
great concern in that it is absolutely lacking in 
reasonable safeguards against arbitrary and unreason-
able action by police officers and the Motor Vehicle 
Commissioner •••• If it were written to provide for 
the demanding of the submission to a test only after a 
driver had been duly arrested and to provide for action 
by the Commissioner on the sworn report of the officer 
making the demand, with a further provision whereby the 
driver could have a hearing, if demanded, with tempo-
rary suspension of license in the meantime, and with 
revocation to follow in the absence of the due demand 
for a hearing or upon due proof on a hearing, this 
court would, without hesitation, approve the statute ••• 
••• On the other hand, conferring upon police 
officers the right to make a request under the guise 
of authority concerning one's person without specific 
process and without lawful arrest clearly amounts to an 
unlawful infringement upon one's liberty ••• 
9. 1963 Supp, to Connecticut General Statutes. Sec. l4-227a. 
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••• We have here a statute providing, in ~ffect, 
that the commissioner may revoke a driver's license 
upon mere hearsay without a hearing. Recent judicial 
statements indicated that a statute having this effect 
is not to be approved ••• 
Although the court did not uphold the validity of the New York 
law, the decision gave tentative approval to implied consent legis-
lation with respect to three areas of constitutional concern: 1) the 
validity of implied consent legislation in regard to "self-incrimin-
ation"; 2) the reasonableness of "search and seizure" aspects of 
implied consent legislation; and 3) the relationship of implied con-
sent to the concept of "equal protection of the laws." The New York 
Supreme Court's statements in these three areas follows:10 
(1) Self-incrimination -- " ••• Bearing in mind the purpose 
of the statute and that highway safety is a matter of great concern to 
the public, it may not be held that it is unreasonable or beyond leg-
islative power to put such a choice to a motorist who is accused upon 
reasonable grounds of driving- while intoxicated. And it is clear that 
one may waive his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 
See People v, Roseheimer, 209 N.Y. 115, .•• 
"It also seems clear that the constitutional privilege would 
not bar the use in the prosecution of a defendant of the results of a 
body fluid test even though taken while he was so drunk as to be con-
fused or unconscious or otherwise in such a condition that it may not 
be said that he voluntarily consented thereto. See, in point,State v, 
Cram, 176 Ore. 577, because the decisions of this state have limited 
the effect of the state constitutional provision against self-incrimin-
ation to protect only as against testimony compulsion, i.e., as to 
disclosures by attendance, oral or written ••• " 
(2) Unreasonable search and seizure -- "·•• the petition 
before the court fails to show any infringement of the petitioner's 
rights under this particular constitutional guarantee in that it ex-
pressly appears therein that the chemical test of his blood was demand-
ed of him after his due arrest. It is clear that, as a general 
proposition, the guarantee protects only against searches made without 
a warrant and beyond the terms of a warrant .. and the papers on which it 
was issued, or against personal searches made before a legal arrest ••• 
NJn any event, the statute, when considered generally, does 
not stand for any unreasonable search or seizure. This. because it is 
premised upon the consent of the licensee to ~ubmit to the test when 
demanded. The licensee is expressly given the option of refusal ••• " 
3) Equal protection of law -- "The essence of the right to equal 
protection of the laws is that all persons similarly situated be treat-
ed alike ••• The constitution does not require that a vehicle and 
traffic law shall apply equally in all respects to licensed and unlic-
ensed operators of vehicles. The licensed operator possesses a 
qualified right granted by the state. He stands in a class different 
from an unlicensed operator of a vehicle and is subject to le.gislation 
specially applying to those persons in his class." 
C 
4 
10. Shutt v. MacDuff (1954), 127 N.Y.S. (2d) 116. 
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Subsequent to the Shutt v. MacDuff decision the New York leg-
. islature revised the implied consent law to conform with the opinion 
of the court. 
On the basis of the New York example, a number of other states 
adopted implied consent legislation, and, as in the New York situation, 
the laws have been attacked on constitutional grounds. For instance, 
in Lee v. State of Kansas (1961), 358 P. (2d) 765, the court upheld 
implied consent legislation, concluding that: 
The statute does not compel one in the plaintiff's 
position to submit to a blood test, and does not require 
one to incriminate himself within the meaning of consti-
tutional provisions. And neither is it violative of due 
process •.. It gives the driver the right of choice of 
the statutory suspension of his license, and further gives 
him the right to a hearing on the question of the reason-
ableness of his failure to submit to the test. Further-
more, under... he has the right of appeal to the 
district court of the county of his residence ••• 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Nebraska ruled that there 
was no denial of due process of law or any violation against self-
incrimination in Prucha v. De artment of Motor Vehicles (1961), 172 
Neb. 415, 110 N.W. 2d 75. The court stated in part: 
The essence of the "implied consent law" is that by 
driving a motor vehicle on the public highway, the oper-
ator consents to the taking of a chemical test to deter-
mine the alcoholic content of his body fluid. By the act 
of driving his car, he has waived his constitutional 
privilege of self-incrimination, which has always been 
considered to be a privilege of a solely personal nature 
which may be waived. 
In United States v. Nesmith, D. C. 121 F. Supp. 
758, 760, it was held that constitutional privilege 
against self-incrimination is restricted to oral testi-
mony and does not preclude use of one's body or secretions 
thereof and their chemical analyses as evidence .•• 
The plaintiff in his petition alleges that the revo-
cation of his driver's license was arbitrary and capri-
cious because he was not convicted of an offense of 
operating a motor vehicle under the infiuence in the 
original court. The fact of acquittal of a criminal 
charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influ-
ence of alcoholic liquor does not have any bearing upon a 
proceeding before the director for the revocation of a 
driver's license under the provisions of law separate and 
distinct from criminal statutes. 
A Virginia case, Walton v. City of Roanoke (1963), 133 S.E. 
(2d) 315, also upheld the constitutionality of implied consent legis-
lation: 
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The constitutional prohibition against compelling 
one in a criminal court to give evidence against himself 
is restricted to oral testimony and does not preclude the 
use of one's body or secretions therefrom and the results 
of their chemical analyses ••• 
We hold that§ 18.1-55 neither required defendant 
to take a blood test nor compelled him to give evidence 
against himself in violation of the 5th Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States or Article I§ 8, 
of the Constitution of Virginia. 
In the State of Idaho v. Bock (1958), 328 P. (2d) 1065, the 
court concluded that where intoxication is an evidentiary element of 
reckless driving in a homicide case involving .the operation of a 
vehicle, the accused has no constitutional grounds for refusal to sub-
mit to a reasonable search and examination of his person, including an 
examination of blood in the manner authorized by law. 
Generally, the validity of implied consent laws also may be 
based on so-called "constructive service of process." For instance, 
in Timm v. State (1961), 110 N.W. (2d) 359, the Nebraska Supreme Court 
contended: 
This "Implied consent" statute is based on reason-
~ng similar to that which has sustained statutes provid-
ing for constructive service of process. Such 
constructive or substituted service of process statutes · 
now are in force in most states. Sinte the early de-
cision in the case of Pawloski v. Hess, 250 Mass. 22 
144 N.E. 760, affirmed by the United States Supreme Court 
in 274 u~ s. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, .•• courts generally 
have held that statutes providing for constructive service 
of process upon users of the highways by service upon the 
Secretary of State or the Highway Commissioner, or upon 
some other person designated in such statute, are 
valid ••• 
Court Decisions -- Administration of Impli~d Consent. A 
number of court decisions have involved proceedings challenging admin-
istrative revocation of a motorist's license, i.e., the administrative 
action was challenged on the basis of the proper interpretation of 
respective statutes pertaining to implied consent, rather than the con-
stitutional validity of the statutes. For example, in State of South 
Dakota v, Batterman (1961), 110 N.W. (2d) 139, a motorist's consent 
to chemical test for determination of blood alcohol content under the 
implied consent law is not invalidated by the fact that he has not been 
informed that refusal to submit will result in forfeiture of driver 
privileges; though his privileges may not be revoked unless he has been 
informed that refusal will result in such penalty. 
R a of w A u • A recent 
supreme court decision in North Dakota, Colling v, Hjelle 1963), 125 
N.W. (2d) 453, invalidated application of the implied consent law 
following acquittal of the defendant under a charge of driving while 
under the influence. The court stated that a peace officer under the 
mistaken belief, however reasonable, that the offense for which the 
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arrest was made was committed in the officer's presence, when in fact 
the person arrested is not guilty of the offense, is not a lawful 
arrest. Section 39-20-01 of North Dakota Code provides"••· Test or 
tests shall be administered at the direction of a law enforcement 
officer only after placing such person ••• under arrest •.• " Thus, the 
court determined that since the arrest was unlawful, the officer could 
not request the defendant to submit to a chemical test. 
In a similar case in New York, Combes v. Kelley (1956), 152 
N.Y.S. (2d) 134, the court rejected the contention expressed in Colling 
v. Hjelle by concluding that the validity of the arrest would depend 
upon the outcome of the subsequent trial, and this could not be con-
sidered as a reasonable interpretation of the statute. 
Type of Test to be Given. Generally, the courts have held 
that the validity of a license suspension may not be affected by the 
failure to provide the defendant a choice of the type of blood test to 
be given. 
In Lee v. State (1961), 358 P. (2d) 765, the Kansas Supreme 
Court held: 
One of plaintiff's complaint is that under the 
statute (8-1001) he or any other driver should be given 
his choice of the four mentioned tests, and that he was 
not offered such right. It is further argued that the 
drawing of blood "shocks the conscience" and is inher-
ently "brutal and offensive." 
••• It is common knowledge that few areas in the 
state have the technical equipment and facilities to ad-
minister all of the tests. 8-1003 ••• provides that 
only a physician or qualified medical technician, acting 
at the request of the arresting officer, is permitted 
to withdraw any blood of a person submitting to a chem-
ical test under the act ••• nothing brutal or offensive 
about that when done under the protective eye of a 
physician or qualified medical technician, but rather 
is admittedly a scientifically accurate method of de-
tecting alcoholic content in the blood ••• 
On the other hand, a Utah court decision, Ringwood v. State 
of Utah (1959), 333 P. (2d) 943, the court held that in some circum-
stances it might be impractical or dangerous, if mandatory, to require 
a certain test, pointing out that persons afflicted with hemophilia, 
etc., should not be forced to submit to a blood test. Since the 
arresting officer confronted the individual with the choice of a blood 
test only, the court concluded that the officer was not acting in 
accordance with the statute. Section 41-6-44.10, Utah Code, states 
" ••• shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test for 
his breath, blood or urine for the purpose .•. " According to the 
Nebraska Court in Timm v. State (1961), 110 N.W. (2d) 359, the addition 
of the words Q1:. tests allowed a different interpretation from the 
Ringwood decision. 
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Temporary Suspension. In the Application of Grimshaw (1957), 
165 N.Y:s. (2d) 263, the New York Supreme Court stated: 
••• that it was the intent of the Legislature 
to require a hearing to be scheduled before a tem-
porary suspension order could be issued and that the 
language, "pending the determination of any such 
hearing" presupposes the scheduling of such a hear-
ing before the issuance of the order. If this were 
not true, a license could be temporarily suspended 
and time for a hearing could be extended for an 
indefinite period ••• 
Operation of a Motor Vehicle -- "Right" or "Privilege" 
The Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Nothaus (1961), 147 
Colo. 210, 363 P. 2d 180, established precedence that the operation of 
a motor vehicle is a "right." The majority opinion of the court stateds 
Every citizen has an inalienable right to make use 
of the public highways of the state; every citizen has 
full freedom to travel from place to place in the enjoy-
ment of life and liberty. The limitations which may be 
placed upon this inherent right of the citizen must be 
based upon a proper exercise of the police power of the 
state in the protection of the public health, safety and 
welfare. Any unreasonable restraint upon the freedom of 
the individual to make use of the public highways can-
not be sustained. Regulations imposed upon the right of 
the citizen to make use of the public highways must 
have a fair relationship to the protection of the public 
safety in order to be valid. 
The regulation and control of traffic upon the 
public highways is a matter which has a definite rela-
tionship to the public safety, and no one questions the 
authority of the General Assembly to establish reasonable 
standards of fitness and -competence to drive a motor 
vehicle which a citizen must possess before he drives a 
car upon the public highway. When a citizen meets the 
standards thus defined in a proper exercise of the 
police power, he has a right to continue in the full en-
joyment of that right until by due process of law it has 
been established that by reason of abuse of the right 
or other just cause it is reasonably necessary in the 
interest of public safety to deprive him of the right to 
drive a motor vehicle on the highways. 
The Nothaus decision may be important in viewing the validity 
of court decisions in other states concerning implied consent, because 
many of these states regard driving as a "privilege." For instance, 
the Nebraska Supreme Court in supporting the validity of constructive 
service of process laws stated, in Timm v, State (1961), 110 N.W. (2d) 
359& 
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The use of the public highways is not an absolute 
right which everyone has 9 and of which a person cannot 
be deprived; it is a right or privilege which a person 
enjoys subject to the control of the state in the valid 
exercise of its police power. Therefore, in view of the 
state's power to regulate the use of its highways, 
statute·s may be enacted which declare that the use of 
the public highways by any person shall be deemed the 
equivalent of an affirmative consent to a chemical test 
or tests of the user's blood, breath, saliva, or urine 
for determination of the alcoholic content of his blood, 
subject to the other provisions of the statute. The law 
does not compel the user to take such chemical tests. 
If he refuses to do so, however, it provides that he 
shall forfeit for a period of ••• 
The Kansas Supreme Court also declared that driving is a 
"privilege" (Lee v. State of Kansas, (1961) 358 P. 2d 765): 
It is an elementary rule of law that the right 
to operate a motor vehicle upon a public street or 
highway is not a natural or unrestrained right, but 
a "privilege" which is subject to reasonable regul-
ation under the police power of the state in the 
interest of public safety and welfare •.• 
On the other hand, New York courts regard driving as a "right" 
and also have upheld the validity of implied consent legislation • . In 
Ballou v, Kelley (1958), 176 N.Y.S. (2d) 1005, the court stated: 
••• although the possession of a license to 
drive is a vested property right (Moore v. MacDuff, 
309 N.Y.S. 35, 127 N.E. 2d 741) and may not be 
taken away except by due process (Wignell v, 
Fletcher, 303 N.Y.S. 435, 103 N.E. 3d 728), the 
Legislature in exercising its power reasonably to 
regulate the use of highways may impose reasonable 
conditions before a license is issued and for the 
continued possession of the same ... 
Implied Consent in Colorado 
Despite the fact that . implied consent legislation has been 
upheld in numerous states, some people believe that the Colorado 
Supreme Court would not uphold a similar law here. That belief is 
based on the court decision in the Nothaus case. However, in the case 
of Block v. People LT19Sl), 156 Col0:-36.240 P. 2d 512/ the court 
appears to have resolved the question relating to self-incrimination. 
In that case the court stated: 
Counsel for defendant cite no Colorado case where 
evidence other than testimonial has been barred because 
it might be incriminating. In Ingles v. People, 92 
Colo. 518, 22 P. (2d) 1109, we held that compellinq one 
who has pleaded not guilty ·by reason of insanity to 
undergo examination, both m~nta! ~nd physical, ~oes ~ot 
constitute compulsory self 1ncr1m1nat1on. So, in this 
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state the distinction between the admission in evidence 
of a physical fact concerning the defendant in a criminal 
case, as distinguished from the matters to which a de-
fendant can be relieved from testifying, already has 
begun to emerge. It would seem to be a proper distinc-
tion. 
A study of the history of the development of such 
a constitutional provision as contained in our Colo-
rado Constitution indicates that the original intent 
was to prevent a defendant from being forced to give 
testimonial evidence against himself, and did not con-
template the exclusion of evidence of physical facts 
relating to the defendant. 8 Wigmore on Evidence (3d 
ed.}, p. 276, 12250. This line of demarcation is clearly 
set forth in Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion in Holt v. 
United States, 218 U.S. 245, 31 .Sup. Ct. 2, 54 L. Ed. 
1021, as follows: "Another objection is based upon an 
extravagant extension of the Fifth Amendment. A ques-
tion arose as to whether a blouse belonged to the 
prisoner. A witness testified that the prisoner put it 
on and it fitted him. It is object~d that he did this 
under the same duress that made his statements inadmis-
sible, and that it should be excluded for the same 
reasons. But the prohibition of compelling a man in a 
criminal court to be witness against himself is a pro-
hibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to 
extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his 
body as evidence when it may be material. The objection 
in principle would forbid a jury to look at a prisoner 
and compare his features with a photograph in proof. 
Moreover, we need not consider how far a court would go 
in compelling a man to exhibit himself. For when he is 
exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order, and even if 
the order goes too far, the evidence, if material, is 
competent. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 24 Supp. 
ct. 372, 48 L. Ed. 575." 
In the recent case of State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 
577, 160 P. (2d} 283, 164 A.L.R. 952, involving a some-
what similar set of facts to those in the instant 
case, the author of the majority opinion, after an ex-
tended consideration of the various cases and after 
referring to Holt v. United States, supra, states: 
"The defendant was not deprived of any of his con-
stitutional rights by the admission of the testimony 
here in question. He was not compelled to testify 
against himself. Evidence of the result of the analysis 
of the blood sample was not his testimony but that of 
Dr. Beeman, distinct from anything the defendant may 
have said or done. The blood sample was obtained with-
out the use of any process against him as a witness. 
He was not required to establish the authenticity, iden-
tity or origin of the blood; those facts were proved by 
other witnesses. 
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"If the evidence here under attack is inadmissible, 
it is difficult to understand under what theory finger-
prints procured under compulsion, or evidence concerning 
them, is admissible. It is equally difficult to compre-
hend why the defendant is not denied his constitutional 
privilege against self-incrimination by being required to 
do the many acts hereinbefore enumerated." 
The Block case would seem to place the Colorado Supreme Court in a 
position of supporting chemical tests as coming under the constitu~ 
tional provisions of lawful ''search and seizure," which could be 
interpreted as minimizing the constitutional question of self-incrimi-
nation in relation to implied consent legislation. 
Examination of the Nothaus _decision reveals the types of 
arguments that could be used in opposition to an implied consent law. 
For instance, in the Nothaus decision counsel for the defense pointed 
out the following:11 
A deposit of security is required regardless of the 
question of guilt of i violation of a traffic law, and 
without regard to the question of whether there was any 
negligence on the part of the person who is required to 
deposit the security. 
The deposit is required after the accident and not 
before it, and operates only to facilitate collection of 
damages by the party who may thereafter be adjudged en-
titled thereto. No protection is offered the public 
with relation to future occurrences. 
The deposit is required only because of the hap-
,, pening of an accident. 
The deposit of security is required without any 
inquiry whatever concerning the liability of the person 
required to make it, and must be made in such sum as in 
the judgment of the director of revenue shall satisfy 
any judgment for damages resulting from the accident, 
no standards are . fixed for the exercise of his discre-
tion, no evidence is taken, and no notice or hearing is 
afforded as to the amount or nature of the security to be 
required. 
According to 13-7-7 the director of revenue is re-
quired to suspend the license of every operator and the 
registrations of every owner of an automobile "in any 
manner involved" in an accident unless there is a de-
posit of security referred to as "sufficient in the judge-
ment of the director to satisfy any judgments for damages 
resulting from such accident as may be recovered against 
such operator or owner." This suspension is mandatory. 
It is not conditioned upon any report being made by the 
operator whose license is suspended. It is not condi-
11. People v, Nothaus (1961), 147 Colo. 210, 363 P. (2d) 180. 
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tioned upon a criminal trial and a finding of guilt. 
This suspension must be made within sixty days after 
the receipt of "a report"~- any report, a true one, 
a false one, an unsworn one, the report of a bystander 
or the hearsay report of any kind by _ any person. 
Similarly, the majority opinion of the Supreme Court agreed 
with the defense counsel, concluding, in part, that: 
(7) The requirement of C.R.S. '53, 13-7-7 that the 
director of revenue, "***shall suspend the license of 
each operator and all registrations of each owner of a 
motor vehicle in any manner involved in such accident 
***"unless such persons deposit a sum . "sufficient in 
the judgment of the director***" to pay any damage 
which may be awarded, or otherwise show ability to indem-
nify the other party to the accident against financial 
loss, has nothing whatever to do with the protection of 
the public safety, health, morals or welfare. It is a 
device designated and intended to bring about the posting 
of security for the payment of a private obligation with-
out the slightest indication that any legal obligation 
exists on the part of any person. The public gets no pro-
tection whatever from the deposit of such security. 
The arguments posed in the Nothaus decision could be applied 
to implied consent legislation, i.e., a defendant could be found not 
guilty in the courts of driving while under the influence and still 
lose his license because of the operation of an implied consent law. 
Theoretically, the individual may never have driven while under the 
influence, yet be subject to license suspension for refusal to submit 
to a chemical test. Thus, the public health and safety in no way is 
protected by application of the law, and the "rights" of the individual 
may be taken away without judicial process. JuJ~ice Moore, in the 
majority opinion in People v. Nothaus declared: 
The question of whether a constitutionally 
guaranteed property right can be denied for some 
justifiable reason, is essentially a judicial 
question, and under the doctrine of separation 
of powers of government it must remain a judicial 
question .•• 
However, the aforementioned argument may not be valid when 
applied to implied consent on the grounds that as a condition for 
operation of a vehicle on the state highways the individual gives 
"consent" to submission to a chemical test if arrested for driving 
while under the influence. This condition may be similar to other 
restrictions imposed by the General Assembly concerning the operation 
of motor vehicles. 
The following statement by Justice Moore seems to lend 




This is not the situation which we find in 
some states where the statutes require public 
liability insurance as a condition to be met 
before a driver's license will issue. such 
statute protects the public. The statute before 
us is entirely different. In the matters to which 
we have particularly directed attention, C.R.S. 
•~3, 13-7-7 is unconstitutional. 
Extending this interpretation further, the public is protected 
because the motorist automatically gives consent to a chemical test 
as a condition for the operation of a motor vehicle. 
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Financial Responsibility 
Colorado's Safety Responsibility Law (13-7-1 to 13-7-29, CRS 
1953, as amended) provides for the suspension of the license and 
registration of financially irresponsible drivers involved in automo-
tive accidents. The law may be considered as effective in encouraging 
most Colorado drivers to obtain liability insurance. For instance, in 
1963, accident reports were filed on 60,873 motor vehicles operating 
in Colorado. Of this number, 51,806 vehicles carried liability 
insurance, or approximately 85 per cent of the tota1.13 Although the 
great majority of Colorado motorists carry liability insurance, there 
re~ains a significant problem in regard to the 15 per cent of the 
motorists who may be classed as financially irresponsible. 
Financial Responsibility in Other States 
Generally, motor vehicle financial responsibility legislation 






security-type safety respon•ibility laws; 
compulsory liability insurance; 
unsatisfied judgment funds; 
impoundment laws; and 
uninsured motorists coverage. 
Security-type safety responsibility laws have been adopted in 
47 states, including Colorado. Basically, these laws provide that if 
a motorist is involved in an accident and a report is filed indicating 
death, injury, or property damage exceeding a statutory minimum, the· 
enforcing agency may suspend the license of the driver who fails to 
deposit the security required by law. Of course, these provisions do 
not apply to insured motorists. In general, safety responsibility laws 
have been credited with increasing the percentage of insured motorists. 
For instance, prior to adoption of the security-type safety responsi-
bility laws, only 25 to 30 per cent of all motorists were insured; 
national estimates at present indicate that over 80 per cent of all 
motorists are insured.14 
Compulsory Liability Insurance, Three states have adopted com-
pulsory liability insurance -- Massachusetts, New York, and North 
Carolina. Compulsory liability insurance is based on the concept of 
requiring a motorist to be financially liable before his vehicle is 
operated on the highways. The administering agency is not allowed to 
issue license plates for a vehicle until the motorist obtains liability 
insurance. 
Impoundment laws simply increase the penalties existing under 
security-type safety responsibility acts. For instance, involvement 
in an accident is grounds for seizure of an uninsured vehicle. If 
claims and storage costs are not paid, the veHicle may be sold by the 
administering agency. 
13. Source: Motor Vehicle Division, State Department of Revenue. 
14. The Financially Irresponsible Motorist in Kentucky. Research 
Report No. 16, 1963, Legislative Research Convnission. 
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Unsatisfied judgment funds are state-operated funds designed 
to assist accident victimswithout contributory negligence) in col-
lecting on claims for damages or injuries inflicted by an uninsured 
motorist. Funds may be financed as follows: by an assessment against 
all motorists, by a comparatively large fee for motorists registering 
an uninsured vehicle, by a combination of the aforementioned, etc. 
States adopting unsatisfied judgment funds include& Maryland, New 
Jersey, and North Dakota. 
Uninsured motorists coverage laws require all liability 
policies to contain a proviso protecting the insured motorists in 
accidents involving uninsured motorists. Some of the states requiring 
uninsured motorists coverage allow an option to the insured motorist 
to be covered or not -- California, Florida Louisiana, Georgia, 
Illinois, Nebraska, Rhode Island, and North Carolina. In addition, 
the states of South Carolina and Virginia provide a program of re-
imbursement to insured motorists to cover the expense of insurance 
against uninsured motorists. The states of New Hampshire, New York, 
South Carolina, and Virginia require liability policies to contain 
coverage for uninsured motorists. 
-Pros and Cons of Financial Responsibility Laws 
Security-type safety responsibility laws encourage motorists 
to obtain liability insurance for their vehicles in order to avoid 
suspension of their driver licenses due to involvement in an accident. 
Also, the truly financially irresponsible motorist, who is involved 
in an accident, may lose his driving privileges, offering some social 
gain to the community. On the other hand, the insured motorist is not 
protected against the initial accident of financially irresponsible 
drivers. 
Compulsory liability insurance forces motorists to buy insur-
ance prior to registration of their motor vehicles. Thus, the number 
of uninsured motorists utilizing the highways is greatly reduced. The 
most serious disadvantage of compulsory insurance is the tendency to-
ward extremely high rates. Other arguments against compulsory insurance 
include: compulsory insurance programs are cumbersome and expensive 
to administer; the higher rates mean, in effect, that the voluntarily 
insured motorists may pay the additional costs; and political pressures 
may influence a state's rate-making policy. 
Unsatisfied judgment funds enable victims involved in accidents 
with uninsured motorists to receive compensation which they would not 
have received in the absence of the fund. The unsatisfied judgment 
funds may also protect victims of hit-and-run drivers as well as un-
insured out-state motorists. In general, the unsatisfied judgment fund 
may ove~come the objections of compulsory insurance. Financing of 
unsatisfied judgment funds appears to be the major disadvantage of the 
funds. For instance, if a fee is assessed against all motorists, the 
vol~ntarily insured motorist again is penalized. On the other hand, a 
substantial fee imposed on the uninsured motorist may cause him to 
believe that he is protected and insurance is not necessary. Also, a 
tax on the uninsured motorist may not raise enough revenue to satisfy 
claims. Other arguments opposed to the fund include the .red tape in 
processing claims, inadequate financing of funds which may lead to 
compulsory insurance, and the high cost of general administration. 
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Impoundment laws are, of course, not a cure-all but another 
attempt to encourage motorists to carry insurance. The public may be 
impressed by impoundment of vehicles and resulting storage costs to a 
sufficient degree that most people will be motivated to obtain insurance. 
However, impoundment probably does not meet the needs of most accident 
victims. Storage costs on an impounded vehicle coupled with other liens 
may not be satisfied by sale of the vehicle, let alone the claim of the 
accident victim. 
Uninsured motorists coverage protects the financially respon-
sible motorists from losses at the hands of uninsured motorists and 
at reasonable cost and with a minimum of state intervention. Also, the 
motorist has a guarantee that would not be available in a compulsory 
program, namely, protection against hit-and-run drivers and against 
the uninsured motorist from out-of-state. A significant disadvantage 
to uninsured motorists coverage programs is that the financial burden 
of protecting accident victim claims rests with the insured motorist. 
The aforementioned areas of legislation provide a brief 
summary of the attempts made in other states to deal with similar 
groups of financially irresponsible motorists. Of the five areas of 
financial responsibility legislation listed, three -- unsatisfied 
judgment funds, impoundment laws, and uninsured motorists coverage --
simply are extensions of laws similar to Colorado's Safety Responsi-
bility Law. Briefly, these laws attempt to penalize the uninsured 
motorists as well as to finance the claims of accident victims of 
uninsured motorists. 
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Motor Scooter Licenses 
Colorado is one of 16 states in whlch a teenager, under 16 
years of age, may operate a motor scooter. The minimum age for the 
legal operation of motor scooters in thre,e states (Alaska, Arkansas, 
and New Mexico) is age 13; states allowingi:-...14-year-olds to operate 
motor scooters include COLORADO, Florida ,1 ..... Louisiana, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming; and the six states permitting motor 
scooter operation at age 15 are -- Hawaii, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Montana, and Virginia. Of the six states allowing oper-
ation of motor scooters at age 15, four states (Hawaii, Mississippi,· 
Montana, and Virginia) issue a.standard operator's license at age 15, 
enabling 15-year-olds to operate automobiles as well as motor scooters. 
Motor Scooter and Bicycle Accidents in Colorado 
The "Standard Summary of Motor Vehicle Accidents," published 
by the Department of Revenue indicates that the number of motor 
scooter accidents and the number of bicycle accidents are quite 
similar. Although the number of accidents is similar, the rate of 
accidents for motor scooters may be much higher because of a smaller 
number of motor scooters in relation to the total number of bicycles 
in Colorado. 
The following figures list the relative number of motor scooter 
and bicycle accidents in Colorado during 1962 and 1963. 
All Accid~nt§ Injui:y Accid~nts Fataliti~~ 
Motor Motor Motor 
~- Scooter Bicycle Scooter Bicycle Scooter Bicycle 
1962 535 518 381 439 2 6 
1963 499 506 351 424 3 6 
Perhaps the aforementioned figures graphically demonstrate the high 
rate of exposure for occupants of two-wheel vehicles .. For instance, 
of 499 motor scooter accidents in Colorado in 1963, 354 resulted in 
death or injury, or 70.94 per cent of the accidents. On the other 
hand, of the 55.171 motor vehicle accidents, 13,623 accidents involv-
ed death or injury, or 24.69 per cent. 
At the July 20 meeting of the committee, Mr. William Berry, 
Executive Secretary of the American Motor Scooter Ass9ciation, made 
the following statement to the committee: 
•.• The Electronic Data Processing Division 
of the Department of Revenue was able to furnish me 
with the results of a special study on motor scooter 
accidents for 1959, 1960, 1961 and through October of 
1962. As far as I know, this is the only accurate 
15. In Florida, motor scooter operators under age 16 may not Gperate 
their vehicles after sundown. 
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information available concerning-the number of 
accidents, fatalities and injuries occurring to 
14 and 15 year old motor scooter operators. From 
January 1, 1959 through October of 1962, 14 and 
15 year old motor scooter operators were involved 
in 973 accidents. In almost four years. there 
were 5 fatalities, about one-half of one per cent. 
Of the 973 accidents, 712 produced injury, or 
73%. During this period of time, approximately 
11,000 14 and 15 year olds were licensed to 
operate motor scooters .•. 
A complete breakdown of figures presented by Mr. Berry at the 
July 20 meeting are included in Tables IX and X. If the accident 
totals for the period from January 1, 1961 through October, 1962 are 
compared to ·the number of licenses issued, the relative accident 
frequency may be clarified. For instance, in 1961 and 1962, 4,386 
youngsters were examined for purposes of obtaining a motor scooter 
license. Based on Mr. Berry's figures, during the same period of 
time, 14 and 15-year-old operators were involved in 523 accidents. In 
other words, if the number of examinations given in the two-year period 
is indicative of the number of licensed operators 14 and 15 years of 
age, then about 11.9 per cent of the youngsters were involved in 
accidents. At the same time, 397 youngsters were injured, or an 
estimated 9.1 per cent. Note that these estimates may be low because 
the accident figures are through October of 1962 only. In summary, 
about one out of every eight 14 or 15-year-old motor scooter operators 
may be involved in an accident, while one out of every 11 may be· injured. 
Generally, data on motor scooter accidents has not been segre-
gated for the past few years. National figures compiled in a report 
by the National Safety Council in 1959 also have not been revised since 
the original study was made.· 
Table IX 
.VOTOR SCOOTER ACCIDENTS INVOLVING 
14 AND 15 YEAR-OLD-OPERATORS*, 
No. of 
Exami- Property % % 
~ nation Fatal Injury Damage Total Fatal Injury 
1959 0 205 101 306 0 
1960 1 110 33 144 .6 
.1961 2,130 3 160 47 210 1.4 
1962** 2,256 l 237 75 ill ..:.....a. 
TOTAL 5 712 256 973 .5 
* Source: Statement by Mr. William Berry to Committee on Driver 
Licensing, July 20, 1964 
** January through October 9 1962. 







MOTOR SCOOTER ACCIDENTS INVOLVING 
16-YEAR-OLD AND OLDER OPERATORS* 
Property % % 
Year Fatal Injury Damage Total Fatal Injury 
1959 2 111 66 179 1.1 
1960 5 150 77 232 2.1 
1961 1 97 41 139 .7 
1962** 0 110 41 ill _Q 
TOTAL 8 468 252 701 1.1 
* Source: Statement by Mr. William Berry to Committee on Driver 
Licensing, July 20, 1964. 







High School Driver Education 
According to national figures prepared for school year 1962-
63, by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, approximately 68 
per cent of qualifying secondary schools offer programs of driver 
education. Also, approximately 52 per cent of eligible students par-
ticipated in driver education courses in school year 1962-63. At the 
same time, only 29 per cent of eligible Colorado high school students 
attended driver education courses, and only 51 per cent of the high 
schools included driver education as part of the curriculum. Table 
XI provides a state-by-state comparison of the relative number of 
secondary schools providing programs of driver education as well as a 
summary of student participation in schools offering driver education 
programs. 
Perhaps the availability of state-aid may have some influence 
on the development of driver education programs. For instance, for 
school year 1962-63, in states providing assistance for high school 
driver education programs, 83.5 per cent of eligible schools offered 
driver education courses, compared to 55.7 per cent for schools in 
states not providing driver education monies. Similarly, student 
participation in states granting state-aid also was greater than for 
states not offering monies for driver education -- 66.1 per cent and 
37.4 per cent of eligible students, respectively. · 
Cost of Driver Education Programs in Colorado 
Data on per pupil cost of high school driver education programs 
in Colorado is contained in the tabulations below. It should be 
recognized that comparison of costs are somewhat meaningless unless 
all other factors are considered. Examples of some of these factors 
are as follows: (1) the differences in salary schedules; (2) the 
philosophy of the school as it relates to teacher-pupil ratio; (3) the 
amounts and kinds of equipment used as teacher aids; and (4) consistency 

































COLORADO DRIVER EDUCATION DATA17 
1. No. of schools which include grade 10 
2. Total number of students in grade 10 
3. No. of students participating in complete 
driver education program 
4. Average cost per student 
5. Present cost to local districts based upon 
average per pupil cost 8,396 @$50.00 
6. Total cost of comple~e program anticipating 
100% student participation 
7. If state-aid at $25 per student were available 
to local districts and anticipating a 50% 
increase into driver education classes, the 
amount of state-aid, less supervision and 
clerical cost, would amount to 
8. Supervisory and clerical 
9. If the driving age is changed from 16 to 
18 years of age unless a student completed 
an approved driver education course, it is 
conceivable that 90% of the total number of 




















DrtIVcR cDUCATHJN -- SECONDARY SCHOOLS* 
SCHOOL PARTICIPATION STUDENT PARTICIPATION 
Schools,...* Total Schools 
Offering Offering No. of Total 
Number of Qualifying Driver Annual Qualifyin~** Driver 
Potential "30 & 6" Per Education Per Eligible "30 & 6" Per Education Per 
State ** Schools Courses Cent Courses Cent Students Courses Cent Enrollment Cent 
Ala. N/R N/R 
Alaska 26 2 8 4 15 2,632 27 1 61 2 
Ariz. 84 65 77 92 100 21,935 7,222 33 17,620 80 
Ark. 478 40 8 42 9 30,576 1,706 6 1,791 6 
Calif. 625 439 70 491 79 259,115 123,075 47 162,904 63 
COLORADO 197 84 43 101 51 25,433 5,113 20 7,296 29 
Conn. 127 86 68 102 80 28,654 9,155 32 12,475 44 
Del. 49 38 78 38 78 7,515 3,704 49 3,704 49 
I D .c. 16 16 100 16 100 --:>-,214 1,687 32 1,687 32 
f:j Fla. 473 285 60 298 63 82,792 57,038 69 57,448 69 
Ga. 558 135 24 149 27 62,013 7,323 12 8,545 14 
I 
Hawaii 31 6 19 6 19 10,5"51 168 2 168 2 
Ida. 158 143 91 143 91 14,231 9,181 65 9,181 . 65 
Ill. 675 613 91 686 100 144,840 \ 81,277 56 129,742 90 
Ind. 335 447 100 483 100 82,142 42,954 52 47,091 57 
Iowa 469 466 99 466 99 46,309 29,887 65 29,887 65 
Kans. 552 421 76 425 77 37,576 24,876 66 25,096 67 
Ky. 377 80 21 - 80 21 48,547 3,701 8 3,701 8 
La. 586 204 35 327 56 58,275 16,202 28 27,117 47 
Me. 157 108 69 108 69 12,072 8,537 71 8,537 71 
Md. 156 120 77 141 90 50,578 12,046 24 16,086 32 
Mass. 220 156 71 262 100 68,096 16,949 25 28,023 41 
Mich. 610 594 97 594 97 131,733 124,464 94 124,464 94 
Minn. 488 416 85 432 89 52,314 32,124 61 32,669 62 
Miss. 441 99 22 119 27 34,049 5,111 15 7,448 22 
Mo. 567 275 49 320 56 64,592 21,546 33 23,959 37 
Table XI 
(continued) 
SCHOOL PARTICIPATION STUDENT PARTICIPATION 
School~** Total Schools 
Offering Offering No. of Total 
Number of Qualifying Driver Annual Qualifyingll-** Driver 
Potential "30 & 6" Per· Education Per Eligible "30 & 6" Per Education Per 
State** Schools Courses Cent Courses Cent Students Courses Cent Enrollment Cent 
:,iont. 191 32 17 42 22 13,085 1,449 11 1,776 14 
Nebr. 408 161 39 188 46 23,465 9,254 39 11,018 47 
Nev. 37 14 38 25 68 5,866 1,228 21 1,700 29 
N.H. 99 44 44 48 48 9,165 2,142 23 2,246 25 
N.J. 251 193 77 251 100 74,233 27,771 37 72,841 95 
N.M. 140 85 61 91 65 20,088 8,048 40 8,644 43 
N.Y. 845 771 91 797 94 218,657 74,925 34 77,734 35 
N.C. 758 747 99 747 99 89,661 55,706 62 55,706 62 
N.D. 304 73 24 175 58 11,281 2,651 23 7,934 70 
Ohio 869 634 73 '654 75 159,532 47,936 30 57,663 36 
~ Okla. 554 286 52 286 52 39,262 17,628 45 17,628 45 
w Ore. 217 105 48 141 65 29,701 7,494 25 14,237 48 
I Pa. 681 575 84 575 84 139,893 54,625 39 86,150 61 
R. I. 38 0 0 49 100 11,372 0 0 14,747 100 
s.c. 417 120 29 166 40 49,602 4,201 8 9,153 18 
S.D. 243 86 35 99 41 12,119 4,837 40 5,692 47 
Tenn. 464 55 12 70 15 54,491 3,569 7 5,557 10 
Texas 1,413 608 43 640 45 174,867. 42,245 24 66,615 38 
Utah 80 79 99 96 100 19,592 18,083 92 18,562 95 
Vt. 83 30 36 34 41 5,890 1,576 27 1,760 30 
Va. 429 158 37 401 93 71,847 11,431 16 56,051 78 
Wash. 201 101 50 145 72 55,587 8,929 16 15,158 27 
W. Va. 316 112 35 114 36 38,119 5,072 13 5,722 15 
Wisc. 426 323 76 366 86 66,226 30,235 46 34,197 52 
Wyo. 77 26 34 27 35 61514 11371 21 11527 23 
Totals 17,996 10,756 60 12,152 68 2,781,899 1,087,479 39 1,436,718 52 
*Source: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. 
**Includes District of Columbia. 
***Includes 30 hours of classroom instruction and six hours practice driving. 
State-aid -- Cost Estimates for Colorado 
If the state of Colorado embarked on a program of state-aid 
to local school districts for driver education programs, the total 
cost to the state would depend on two factors: 1) the level of state 
participation; and 2) the number of students in the program. Assuming 
a proposed driver education program on a state-wide basis would attract 
100 per cent of eligible high school students, the following figures 
reflect the cost estimates of a program of state-aid for driver train-
ing for various levels of state contributions. 
Level of State Participation Estimated Maximum State-Aid 
$10.00 per pupil $ 304,000 
15.00 II 456,000 
20.00 II 608,000 
25.00 II 760,000 
30.00 II 912,000 
35.00 II 1,064,000 
40.00 II 1,216,000 
In all probability, 100 per cent participation of 10th grade 
students in a program of driver education only would be applicable in 
the event a compulsory or semi-compulsory driver training program were 
adopted by the General Assembly, i.e,, if the minimum age for operation 
of a motor vehicle were raised to age 18, unless a youngster completed 
a driver education course, the demand for driver education would be 
universal throughout the state. On the other hand, if driver education 
is to remain an optional program for local school districts and state-
aid is to be used for purposes of encouraging driver training, student 
participation may not exceed two-thirds of eligible enrollment. For 
example, in the 23 states adopting programs of state-aid, about 65 per 
cent of eligible students are participating in driver training programs. 
Table XII contains the estimated cost to Colorado for a 
proposed state-assisted program of driver education, based on 65 per 
cent of the students taking part in the program. With this in mind, 
if the state contributes $20 per pupil, the estimated cost to the state 
would amount to $395,000,to the school districts $592,800, and for the 
total program $988,000. 
Table XII 
ESTIMATED COST OF STATE-AID FOR DRIVER EDUCATION IN COLORADO* 
Amount of State- Est. Cost Est. Cost to Estimated Cost 
aid E~{ fY~il IQ §ts1te ~s:cb2ol Di~:t;c:is:c:t~ Qf f;cQg;c:am 
$10.00 per pupil $197,600 $790,400 $988,000 
15.00 II 296,400 691,600 988,000 
20.00 II 395,200 592,800 988,000 
25.00 II 494,000 494,000 988,000 
30.00 II 592,800 395,200 988,000 
35.00 II 691,600 296,400 988,000 
40.00 II 790,400 197,600 988,000 
* Based on 65 per cent of eligible students participating in program. 
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Financing State Assistance for Driver Education 
Twenty-three states have adopted legislation providing for 
programs of state-aid for high school driver education programs (See 
Table XIII). 
Six methods of financing driver training programs are employed 
by these states in providing assistance to secondary schools for driver 
education: 
1) additional fee on driver licenses (nine states -- Florida, 
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, Oregon, Virginia, and 
Wisconsin); 
2) general revenues (five states -- Connecticut, Delaware, 
Louisiana, Maine, Rhode Island); 
3) penalty assessments -- fines for motor vehicle violations, 
etc. (four states -- California, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Washington); 
4) fee on learners' permits (two states -- Maryland and 
Pennsylvania); 
5) fee on motor vehicle registrations (two states -- North 
Carolina and Utah); and 
6) the state of New Hampshire utilizes the proceeds from a 
$5 service fee for initialed number plates. Table XIII lists the source 
of funds for state-aid programs and the average amount allocated per 
pupil in the 1962-63 school year. 
As may be noted, with the exception of states utilizing gen-
eral revenue monies, funds earmarked for driver education programs are 
obtained from sources related to the operation of motor vehicles. 
Consequently, the adult driver is supporting driver education programs 
to a large extent. On the other hand, two states -- Maryland and 
Pennsylvania -- provide that driver training revenues must be collect-
ed from the young drivers through a fee on learners' permits. 
Applicability of Various State Revenue Sources to Financing Driver 
Education in Colorado 
A number of problems exist in atte~pting to utilize the 
methods adopted in other states for financing driver education in 
Colorado. For instance, the most popular method of financing state-
aid to driver education is through additional fees on motor vehicle 
driver licenses. Article X, Section 18, Colorado Constitution, may 
prohibit the adoption of similar plans for Colorado: 
••• the proceeds from the imposition of any 
license, registration, fee or other charge with 
respect to the operation of any motor vehicle upon 
any public highway in this state and the proceeds 
from the imposition of any excise tax on gasoline 
or other liquid motor fuel shall, except costs of 
administration, be used exclusively for the con-
struction, maintenance, and supervision of the 
public highways of this state. (emphasis added) 
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Table XIII 
SOURCE OF STATE FUNDS FOR SUPPORT OF DRIVER 
EDUCATION PROGRAMS IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS* 
Average Per Pupil Reimbursement -- 1962-63 
Fee on 
General Penalty Fee on Learner's Fee -- Motor 
Fund Assessment License Permit Vehicle Reg. 
























* Source: 1964 Report of American Automobile Association 
N.A. -- Not available 
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. Briefly, the Colorado Constitution restricts the use of monies 
collected from motor vehicle licenses\ permits, and registration fees 
to four purposes: 1) construction; 2} maintenance; 3) supervision of 
highways; and 4) administration. . 
Fee on Driver Licenses and Registrations. At first glance, 
the constitution appears to prevent the earmarking of any special fees 
related to motor vehicle or driver license assessment for the purpose 
of driver training; however, this conclusion may not be valid. The 
essence of driver training is making the highways safe for travel and 
may be as important to the operation of vehicles on the highways as 
the engineering and design of safe highways or the administration of 
a driver license program to prevent persons incapable ~f operating a 
vehicle safely to utilize the highways. Driver training, or a program 
of safe driving, simply may be a fundamental conditiori to proper 
operation of a motor vehicle. Therefore, the terms "supervision of 
highways" and "administration of license and registration laws" as 
referred to in the constitution may, in essence, embrace the concept 
of highway safety training. 
Precedence for an expanded highway safety program, utilizing 
monies from the highway user fund, already may be an accepted state 
·program, i.e., the General Assembly appropriates highway user tax 
monies for support of the Highway Safety Council's and the State 
Patrol's activities in safe driver campaigns. 
Perhaps a proposed program of highway safety, financed through 
the resources of the highway user tax fund, could be administered by 
the Department of Revenue, the State Patr-ol, or the Highway Safety 
Council and not be in contradiction of Article X, Section 18. 
Motor Vehicle Fines and Penalties. Another possible source 
of revenue for an expanded program of driver education includes monies 
from motor vehicle fines and penalties collected pursuant to Section 
13-2-16, CRS 1953, as amended. Fifty per cent of all motor vehicle 
fines collected by magistrates, judges, clerks of courts of record, 
and justices of the peace, coupled with penalty assessments collected 
by the State Patrol are earmarked for the highway user fund. The 
remaining fifty per cent of fines and penalties are deposited to county 
general funds. 
Mr. Frank Mansheim, assistant chief of the Motor Vehicle 
Division,reports that the state's share from fines collected in 1963 
from justices of the peace, etc., amounted to $547,60Q; also, the state 
retained $351,400 in penalty assessments from the State Patrol. In 
total, the state's share for fines and penalty assessments amounted to 
over $899,000. On a continuing basis, Mr. Mansheim reports that a 
growth factor of between five and ten per cent per year may be estimat-
ed for motor vehicle fines and penalty assessments. 
Of course, a significant advantage to utilizing fines and 
penalty assessments for the purpose of financing a program of driver 
education is the elimination of constitutional questions concerning a 
redistribution of highway user monies. 
- 47 -
Adeguacy of Fines and Penalties to Support Driver Education, 
If the state adopted a program of driver education and allocated $25 
per pupil as the total estimated state share, the approximate program 
cost (based on 100 per cent student participation) would amount to 
$760,000 and could be financed from fines and penalty assessments. A 
voluntary program in which student participation would not exceed about 
65 per cent of enrollment in the 10th grade of the public schools also 
could be financed by a program of state-aid at a level of about $40 per 
pupil. 
Replenishment of Highway User Funds, If a proposed program of 
driver education is to be financed through monies presently earmarked 
for the highway user tax fund, perhaps replenishment of highway user 
funds currently utilized for other programs may be needed. Additional 
monies could be raised for current highway user tax fund purposes 
through increased license or registration fees. 
In 1963, approximately 440,000 motor vehicle driver licenses 
were issued in Colorado. With the exception. of motor scooter and minor 
licenses, operators' licenses are issued every three years. The number 
of driver licenses issued in the two preceding years amounted to 
381,572 (1961) and 339,431 (1962). The three-year-average of number 
of licenses issued exceeds 387,000. On the basis of licenses issued, 
the amount of money that would be collected by an additional fee of 
one dollar per license probably would not be sufficient to cover the 
cost of a driver education program, that is, if the total cost of the 
proposed state-aid program is estimated at well over $500,000. In 
other words, a program of state-aid involving $25 per pupil and 100 per 
cent attendance would cost about $760,000, while an additional fee on 
driver licenses would average less than $400,000 per year. Of course, 
if licenses were issued annually, the number of licenses issued probably 
would exceed one million, providing a ready source of funds, based on 
present fees. 
License plates for all motor vehicles are issued annually in 
Colorado. Over 1,169,000 license plates were issued for motor vehicles 
in Colorado in 1963. Section 13-5-23, 1960 Perm. Supp., could be 
amended to require an additional fee on all motorcycles, motor vehicles, 
and trucks to provide an additional fee of seventy~five cents which 
would be adequate to meet the cost of a driv.er education program in-. 
volving about $760,000 in state-aid. 
Effectiveness of Driver Education 
In 1963, the Secretary of the State of Illinois in cooperation 
with the Highway Traffic Safety Center of the University of Illinois 
conducted a detailed analysis of violation and accident records of 
teenagers 16 to 20 years of age. Briefly, this study may pose some of 
the difficult problems encountered in evaluating data related to measur-
ing the effectiveness of high school driver education programs. 
Table XIV summarizes the findings of the Illinois study as it 
relates to the collision or accident records of Illinois teenagers, 
comparing high school driver education graduates with teenagers not 
participating in high school driver training programs. Briefly, although 
the driver education graduates appear to have a slightly better record, 








old category, the accident rate per 1,000 drivers is higher for both 
male and female drivers participating in driver education programs 
than 18-year-olds not participating in driver education. Similarly, 
19-year-old male driver education graduates have a greater collision 
rate -- driver education graduates collision rate per 1,000 drivers 
is 184, opposed to 174 for those without training. 
Table XIV 
ILLINOIS STUDY OF TEEN-AGE ACCIDENT RECORDS 
HIGH SCHOOL DRIVER EDUCATION COMPARED TO NON-DRIVER EDUCATION 
Driver Education Graduat~§· No Higb School Driver Training 
· Collision Rate Collision Rate 
p~~ 1.000 DtiV~t~ Per 1 1 000 D~iver§ Both No. of Both No. of 
Sexes Male Female Drivers Sexes Male Female Drivers 
7 10 4 58,284 11 14 6 30,426 
33 47 18 38,837 40 52 22 55,405 
76 110 42 34,665 77 102 37 60,964 
129 184 61 30,460 129 174 57 83,252 
137 218 77 14,586 178 250 73 109,897 
Doubt may be cast on the validity of reports on the value of 
driver education which do not provide information as to the conditions 
under which the test and control groups are operating. For instance, 
in the Illinois study, all drivers' records were utilized, raising 
the following questions: Were there geographical differences between 
the two test groups -- rural or suburban? Were psychological factors 
reflecting attitudes on driver education present? And, were other 
factors including the percentage of school dropouts reflecting variations 
in ex~osure rates present to the degree that the findings may not be 
valid? 
At the July 20 meeting of the Committee, Dr. John Conger, 
Colorado University Medical School,outlined tentative findings con-
cerning a study of 4,500 high school students in the Denver area. A 
sampling of 513 students of the 4,500 studied reveals the following 
rough estimates for accident rates, economic status, exposure, and 
intelligence of the three grou~s -- Group I (students voluntarily par-
ticipating in driver education); Group II (students wanting to 
participate, but not able to); Group III (students who did not wish 
to participate and did not participate). 
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Generally, the aforementioned estimates indicate that teen-
agers participating in driver education courses achieved a better 
record but drove fewer miles. Also, the youngsters in Group I were 
less economically deprived. The differences in driving records appear 
to fade out wh~n controlled for amount of exposure. 
- 50 -
